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SHAFTESBURY RECONSIDERED: STOIC ETHICS 
AND THE UNREASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY 
 
TIM STUART-BUTTLE 
 
 
Anthony Ashley Cooper, third earl of Shaftesbury, is a complex 
figure in the intellectual history of eighteenth-century Britain. He 
can easily appear as an anachronism, contemptuous or ignorant of 
the advances in learning underway in the age in which he lived. 
In the original index to the second edition of his Characteristicks 
of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (1714), ‘Metaphysicks’ is 
followed by ‘necessary Knowledge of nothing knowable or 
known’. Under ‘Philosophers’ are the entries ‘See CLOWN’, and 
‘Moral Philosophers of a modern sort, more ignorant and corrupt 
than the mere Vulgar’.1 One seeks an entry for ‘Newton, Isaac’ in 
vain; and whilst Bacon had the honour of being cited by 
Shaftesbury—once—it was only to establish that he had been 
fortunate to have ‘escap’d being call’d an ATHEIST’ by his 
contemporaries, an oversight Shaftesbury was eager to remedy.2 
Rather than trouble himself with the productions of a modern age 
whose philosophy he considered to be ‘rotten’, Shaftesbury 
unabashedly proclaimed his preference for the Stoic moralists of 
classical antiquity. In his General Dictionary (1739), Thomas 
Birch noted that Shaftesbury ‘carried always with him’ the ‘moral 
works of Xenophon, Horace, the Commentaries and Enchridion 
 
 1 Shaftesbury’s original index can be found in Characteristicks of Men, Manners, 
Opinions, Times, ed. D. Den Uyl (3 vols., Indianapolis, 2001), iii, 253–92. Three 
scholarly editions of Characteristicks have recently been published, but the Liberty 
Fund edition presents the text in the format closest to that in which eighteenth-century 
readers would have encountered it. For a discussion of the respective merits of the 
various editions, see Michael B. Prince, ‘Editing Shaftesbury’s Characteristicks’, 
Essays in Criticism, 54 (2004): 38–59. The Liberty Fund text, used here, is based on the 
third edition of 1732. 
 2 Miscellany II [1711], in Characteristicks, iii, 45. 
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of Epictetus as published by Arrian, and Marcus Antoninus’.3  
 In two notebooks crammed with citations drawn from the 
writings of these classical philosophers (the Askēmata), largely 
compiled from the later 1690s, Shaftesbury’s contempt for the 
degenerate age in which he lived is laid bare.4 The greatest threat 
to the tranquillity (apatheia) he sought through philosophy, 
Shaftesbury repeatedly reminded himself, was his concern that 
‘the ancients be remembered’, their ‘generous 
sentiments…restored’ and philosophy thereby reclaimed from the 
‘superstition, barbarity, darkness and night’ into which it had 
fallen.5 It would be beyond the capabilities of even the best and 
wisest of men, Shaftesbury noted, to achieve such an objective. 
Following Epictetus’s maxim that the wise man restrained his 
desires to the pursuit of those things that were within his ‘power’, 
Shaftesbury sought strictly to discipline himself against relapsing 
into the mournful reflection on ‘those more glorious times’ from 
which ‘all the regret and trouble arose’, and by which his 
tranquillity was repeatedly disturbed: 
 
But why are there no more roses?—This is not the season, let that content 
thee…Let others speak magnificently of virtue, not thou. It is enough if 
thou act thy part silently and quietly, keeping thy rules and principles to 
thyself; and not hoping ever to make these understood by others. What 
could even Socrates or Epictetus do if now alive? For suppose they had 
 
 3 A General Dictionary, Historical and Critical (10 vols., London, 1734–41), ix 
(1739), 186 n. Q. Much of the content for the entry on Shaftesbury was provided by his 
son (the fourth earl) and his nephew James Harris, which explains the sympathetic 
account it provides. On this, see Isabel Rivers, ‘Biographical Dictionaries and their 
Uses from Bayle to Chalmers’, in id. (ed.), Books and their Readers in Eighteenth-
Century England: New Essays (London, 2001), 161–62. 
 4 The National Archives [NA], 30/24/27/10. These were published, albeit 
incompletely and with unreliable dating, in Benjamin Rand (ed.), The Life, Unpublished 
Letters and Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury (New York, 1900; 
repr. London, 1992). Where accurate, I cite from Rand’s edition. For discussion of the 
Askēmata, see Laurent Jaffro, ‘Les Exercices de Shaftesbury: un Stoïcisme 
Crépusculaire’, in P.-F. Moreau (ed.), Le Stoïcisme au XVe et au XVIIe Siècle: le Retour 
des Philosophies à L’Âge Classique (Paris, 1999), 340–54. 
 5 ‘Human Affairs’, in Life, Letters, 77. 
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lived with children only, and not with men: what if with Moors or 
Barbarians, what if with Goths, or a nation of Turks?—Consider what we 
now are; amongst whom; what opinions; what lives; and where those are 
whom we can call men. […] Fear nothing but losing thyself.6  
 
 Shaftesbury’s classicism has been portrayed in various ways, 
most of which have been dismissive of his profundity as a 
philosopher. Ernst Cassirer, for example, argued that 
Shaftesbury’s classicism reflected an ‘aloofness from his own 
time’, and a lack of interest in ‘the problems affecting his era, or 
[in] the intellectual and practical decisions’ it sought to 
formulate.7 D. D. Raphael portrays Shaftesbury as the founder of 
the ‘moral sense’ school, yet argues that he was unable to develop 
his insights systematically. One finds in Shaftesbury’s writings 
[we are told] ‘no coherent view...about moral theory in general’. 
That task was left to abler philosophers such as Francis 
Hutcheson and Adam Smith.8 Meanwhile Raphael, following 
Smith, regards the Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit (1699) as 
Shaftesbury’s sole significant contribution to the field.9  
 Scholars in other disciplines have, however, increasingly 
offered an interpretation of Shaftesbury, in explicit contrast to 
Cassirer, as a thinker keenly engaged with contemporary political, 
cultural and literary currents. Yet in so doing, they have tended to 
downplay the interpretative importance of Shaftesbury’s profound 
 
 6 ‘Self’, in Life, Letters, 118; and see Epictetus, Encheiridion, trans. N. P. White 
(Indianapolis, 1983), 1 (§1), 19 (§19). This act of self-discipline was both arduous and 
relentless: ‘Arise! Up! Or art thou weary of this work? Is it ever to cease? is it ever to 
relax? Why shrink then? why draw back? what effeminacy is this?’ (‘Maxims’, in Life, 
Letters, 230). 
 7 Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, trans. F. C. A Koelln & J. P. 
Pettegrove (Princeton, 1951), 313. 
 8 D. D. Raphael, The Moral Sense (London, 1947), 17. 
 9 The following anthologies include extracts from the Inquiry: L.A. Selby-Bigge 
(ed.), British Moralists (2 vols., Oxford, 1897), i, 1–66; D. D. Raphael (ed.), British 
Moralists, 1650–1800 (2 vols., Oxford, 1969), i, 195–223; and J. B. Schneewind (ed.), 
British Moralists from Montaigne to Kant (2 vols., Cambridge, 1990), ii, 488–500. 
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classicism for an understanding of his philosophical objectives, 
and to neglect the substantive content of that philosophy itself. 
Laurence Klein argues that Shaftesbury possessed a ‘self-
consciously modern outlook’, and that his classicism was entirely 
subordinated to his ‘cultural politics’.  Shaftesbury’s ‘polite’ 
philosophy is most notable for its highly original ‘deployment of 
discursive strategies’.10 Klein’s ‘philosopher of sociability’ does 
indeed seem strikingly ‘modern’. This Shaftesbury bears a 
marked (and perhaps suspicious) resemblance to the pre-eminent 
theorist of the public sphere, Jürgen Habermas, offering a theory 
of communicative action and an ethics as well as a politics of 
discourse, with an ideal speech situation as a model not merely 
for the pursuit of truth but for a just form of human life.11 Michael 
Prince has questioned Klein’s interpretation but abandoned the 
context of antiquity altogether, whilst accepting that in the case of 
Shaftesbury one cannot speak of a ‘coherent philosophical 
output’. Prince’s interpretation once again rests on a low 
estimation of Shaftesbury’s place in the history of philosophy. 
Shaftesbury’s lack of depth in reasoning was, however, offset by 
his willingness to play with language and form; and it is here that 
he is of greatest scholarly interest.12 
 This article makes a case for taking Shaftesbury seriously as 
thinker who sought to explore questions in and about philosophy 
that were of urgent contemporary interest. This alone explains 
why the great and good of the European republic of letters felt 
compelled to respond to Shaftesbury and even, in the case of 
 
 10 Laurence E. Klein, Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness (Cambridge, 1994), 
1, 20–21, 47, 111. 
 11 For Habermas, see Anthony Giddens, ‘Jürgen Habermas’, in Q. Skinner (ed.), 
The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences (Cambridge, 1985), 121–39. For 
insightful critical discussion of the Habermasian interpretation of the late Stuart period, 
see Mark Knights, Representation and Misrepresentation in Later Stuart Britain: 
Partisanship and Political Culture (Oxford, 2005), 48–53. 
 12 Michael B. Prince, Philosophical Dialogue in the British Enlightenment. 
Theology, Aesthetics, and the Novel (Cambridge, 1996), 23–73. 
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Smith, to resort to ad hominem attacks.13 In developing this case 
this essay makes two related claims.  The first is that 
Shaftesbury was profoundly perturbed by Locke’s moral 
theology, to an extent that has largely been overlooked. William 
Spellman claims that Shaftesbury was an inattentive, even 
‘erroneous reader’ of Locke: his ‘disagreement with Locke was 
significant, but only in the context of his failure, shared by so 
many others in the seventeenth century, to understand Locke’s 
position on the origins of universal morality’. This verdict needs 
revising.14  
 This leads to the second argument advanced in this essay. 
Shaftesbury’s classicism finds its most important (though not 
exclusive) context in Locke’s distinctive treatment of classical 
moral philosophy. Shaftesbury’s concern to respond to Locke saw 
him offer an alternative, and quite original, narrative of 
philosophy’s history. This was a story of progressive degeneracy 
in which Christianity was centrally implicated; and it had seen the 
Stoic tradition corrupted by Christian apologists who had sought 
to reconcile its teachings with—and to subordinate them to—
Christian doctrine. Here Shaftesbury engaged with debates 
regarding the historical relationship between moral philosophy 
and religious belief—both idolatrous and Christian—which 
preoccupied European philologers and religious apologists from 
 
 13 Smith was scathingly critical of Shaftesbury, whom he considered to be ‘of no 
great depth in Reasoning’, something reflected in his inability to engage in abstract 
thought of the kind demanded by metaphysics: Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles-Lettres, 
ed. J. C. Boyce & A. S. Skinner (Oxford, 1983), 57–58, 142. For rather inconclusive 
discussion of Smith’s uncharacteristic enmity towards Shaftesbury, see Douglas Den 
Uyl, ‘Das Shaftesbury Problem’, and the responses by James Otteson and Ryan Patrick 
Hanley, in The Adam Smith Review, 6, ed. F. Forman-Barzilai (Abingdon, 2011), 209–
31. 
 14 William M. Spellman, John Locke and the Problem of Depravity (Oxford, 1988), 
201. Jason Aronson, ‘Critical Note: Shaftesbury on Locke’, American Political Science 
Review, 53 (1959): 1101–4, in contrast, observes that Shaftesbury, as a ‘highly 
intelligent and articulate man’ who was close to Locke, was ‘singularly competent to 
comprehend his tutor’s system and appreciate its originality before it became the 
common coin of later decades’. 
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at least G. J. Vossius’s De Theologia Gentili et Physiologia 
Christiana (1641) onwards.  
 In recent years scholars have begun to recover the importance 
of the fields of sacred history and the history of scholarship for 
our understanding of early Enlightenment moral, political and 
religious thought.15 Shaftesbury’s contribution to these fields of 
inquiry, largely occluded in the scholarship, is essential for a 
better understanding of the meaning, significance and originality 
of his philosophy taken as a whole.   
 
§1. 
In a letter of 1708 to his protégé Michael Ainsworth, Shaftesbury 
held his former tutor Locke primarily culpable for the profoundly 
impoverished state of contemporary moral philosophy: 
 
’Twas Mr. LOCKE, that struck the home Blow: For Mr. HOBBES’s 
Character and base slavish Principles in Government took off the Poyson 
of his Philosophy. ’Twas Mr. LOCKE that struck at all Fundamentals, 
threw all Order and Virtue out of the World, and made the very Ideas of 
these (which are the same as those of GOD) unnatural, and without 
Foundation in our Minds.16  
 
Here Shaftesbury touched on a theme to which he later returned 
in his published works. ‘I have learnt’, Shaftesbury declared in 
Sensus Communis (1709), ‘that Virtue is never such a Sufferer, by 
being contested, as by being betray’d. My Fear is not so much 
from its witty Antagonists, who give it Exercise, and put it on its 
Defense, as from its tender Nurses, who are apt to over-lay it, and 
kill it, with Excess of Care and Cherishing’.17 Hobbes had already 
 
 15 For a concise, critical overview, see Dimitri Levitin, ‘From Sacred History to the 
History of Religion: Paganism, Judaism, and Christianity in European Historiography 
from Reformation to “Enlightenment”’, Historical Journal, 55 (2012), 1117–60. 
 16 Shaftesbury to Michael Ainsworth, 3 June 1709, in Several Letters Written by a 
Noble Lord to a Young Man at the University (London, 1716), 39. 
 17 Sensus Communis [1709], in Characteristicks, i, [Part] 2. [Sect.] 3, 61. 
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been referred to a few pages earlier as ‘an able and witty 
Philosopher of our Nation’ and ‘a mere political Writer’, whose 
sole objective had been to offer an antidote to the ruinous 
doctrines of the ‘Fanatics and Enthusiasts’ by whom he had been 
surrounded. Given that antinomians found in their superficial 
reading of classical philosophy a means of defending their 
seditious political and religious tenets, Hobbes had found it 
expedient to advocate the ‘Extirpation of antient Literature’ 
altogether ‘in favour of his Leviathan-Hypothesis, and new 
Philosophy’. Leviathan represented a political intervention, rather 
than a genuine contribution to moral and religious philosophy. It 
was not to be taken seriously.18 
 The case of ‘the credulous Mr. LOCKE’ was, however, quite 
different. Locke had genuinely sought to defend the sacred causes 
of virtue and religion; and his political philosophy and defence of 
toleration had justly gained him an authority over a broad 
readership.19 Locke, Shaftesbury suggested, would have been able 
easily to repel Hobbes’s superficial (though witty) barbs had he 
‘known but ever so little of antiquity, or been tolerably learned in 
the state of philosophy with the ancients’.20 This knowledge 
would have alerted Locke to the timeless verity that there were—
and are—but two genuine philosophies, irreconcilable one with 
the other, only one of which might allow for a just understanding 
(and defence) of both a deity which was genuinely worthy of 
men’s reverence and of an immutable and eternal moral law to 
which men were obligated. This was a point understood by all 
true philosophers— most especially Horace, who Shaftesbury 
argued had fluctuated between these two philosophical traditions 
before he finally made his choice.21 It was from Horace’s writings 
 
 18 Ibid., 2.1, 56 n. 
 19 Shaftesbury to Ainsworth, 3 June 1709, in Several Letters, 38–39. 
 20 Shaftesbury to General James Stanhope, 7 Nov. 1709, in Life, Letters, 413–17. 
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that Shaftesbury claimed to draw the following insight, which he 
invited Locke’s French translator, Pierre Coste, to consider: 
 
Nor were there, indeed, any more than two real distinct philosophies, the 
one derived from Socrates, and passing into the old Academic, the 
Peripatetic, and Stoic; the other derived in reality from Democritus, and 
passing into the Cyrenaic and Epicurean. For as that mere sceptic, and new 
Academic, it had no certain precepts, and so was an exercise or sophistry 
rather than a philosophy. The first, therefore, of these two philosophies 
recommended action, concernment in civil affairs, religion. The second 
derided all, and advised inaction and retreat, and with good reason. For the 
first maintained that society, right and wrong was founded in Nature, and 
Nature had a meaning, and was herself, that is to say in her wits, well 
governed and administered by a simple and perfect intelligence. The 
second again derided this, and made Providence and Dame Nature not so 
sensible as a doting woman. The first, therefore, of these philosophies is to 
be called the civil, social, Theistic; the second, the contrary.22 
 
That Shaftesbury chose to bring this point to Coste’s attention is 
not coincidental. Under Shaftesbury’s influence, Coste’s 
interpretation and estimation of Locke’s moral theory altered 
significantly. From viewing Locke as a valuable ally in the effort 
to discredit Hobbes, Coste subsequently agreed with 
Shaftesbury—whose Sensus Communis he translated in 1710—
 
 21 For the highly idiosyncratic and personal nature of Shaftesbury’s reading of 
Horace, whom he saw to have begun as a Stoic, converted to Epicureanism under the 
influence of Maecenas’ court and gradually (and finally) re-converted to Stoicism, see 
Frank Stack, Pope and Horace: Studies in Imitation (Cambridge, 1985), 1–17, 116–22, 
150–53, 222–27, 245–51; and Laurent Jaffro and Christian Maurer, ‘Reading 
Shaftesbury’s Pathologia: An Illustration and Defence of the Stoic Account of the 
Emotions’, History of European Ideas, 39 (2013): 208–9. For the hostility of many 
interpretations of Horace in an age rather misleadingly termed the ‘Augustan’, see 
Howard D. Weinbrot, ‘History, Horace, and Augustus Caesar: Some Implications for 
Eighteenth-Century Satire’, in id., Eighteenth-Century Satire: Essays on Text and 
Context from Dryden to Peter Pindar (Cambridge, 1988), 21–33. 
 22 Shaftesbury to Pierre Coste, 1 Oct. 1706, in Life, Letters, 359. Shaftesbury 
presented this passage as a faithful translation of the Epistles, but exercised 
considerable latitude to expand vastly on the original. Compare with Horace, Epistles: 
Book I, ed. R. Mayer (Cambridge, 1994), 1.16 (55). 
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that Locke had, quite disastrously, erected his moral theory on 
broadly Hobbesian foundations.23  
 The ‘two real distinct philosophies’ identified by Horace had, 
Shaftesbury argued, sought to provide men with a ‘Vitae Dux’ 
(guide to life) and a ‘regimen’ that encouraged the suppression of 
those affections considered to impede men’s acquisition of self-
mastery and constancy.24 Here it is important to note, as 
historians have largely failed to do, that in his writings those 
considered true disciples of Epicureanism—‘honest Epicurus’ 
himself, Lucretius and Pierre Bayle—were treated with 
considerable sympathy by Shaftesbury.25 Epicurus had not denied 
that men were naturally possessed of ‘social affections’. On the 
contrary, it was because men’s love of society and concern for the 
good of others were so strong that he considered them to be so 
dangerous.  
 
 23 For the attribution of the French translation of Sensus Communis (Essai sur 
L’Usage de la Raillerie (La Haye, 1710)) to Coste, see James Dybikowski, ‘Letters 
from Solitude: Pierre Coste’s Correspondence with the Third Earl of Shaftesbury’, in P. 
-Y. Beaurepaire, J.  Häsler & A. McKenna (eds.), Réseaux de Correspondance à L’Age 
Classique (XVIe–XVIIIe Siècle) (Saint-Etienne, 2006), 109–33. For a more general 
discussion of Shaftesbury’s influence on Coste’s increasingly hostile attitude to Locke, 
see id., ‘“Aspers’d and Blacken’d”: Pierre Coste’s Critique of Locke’s Moral Theory’, 
Enlightenment and Dissent, 23 (2004–2007), 1–23; and J. R. Milton, ‘Pierre Coste, 
John Locke, and the Third Earl of Shaftesbury’, in S. Hutton & P. Schuurman (ed.), 
Studies on Locke: Sources, Contemporaries, and Legacy (Dordrecht, 2008), 195–223. 
Shaftesbury was far from alone in interpreting Locke’s moral theory as indebted to 
Hobbes in regrettable ways: Thomas Burnet, Henry Lee, James Lowde and Isaac 
Newton—to name only some of those who responded to Locke in his lifetime—
expressed similar reservations. 
 24 The claim that philosophy could alone furnish men with a ‘Vitae Dux’ is found in 
Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author [1710], in Characteristicks, i, 3.1, 184, and 
immediately precedes a concerted assault on Lockean epistemology. The continued, 
early-modern conception of philosophy as an activity concerned above all with self-
cultivation is emphasised by Sorana Corneanu, Regimens of the Mind: Boyle, Locke, 
and the Early Modern Cultura Animi Tradition (London, 2011); and Pierre Hadot, 
Philosophy as a Way of Life. Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, ed. A. I. 
Davidson, trans. M. Chase (Oxford, 1995). 
 25 See, for example, Klein’s claim that Shaftesbury saw Hobbes as an ‘Epicurean 
revivalist’: Culture of Politeness, 60–69. It is more accurate to say that he considered 
Hobbes’s philosophy as a grievously perverted form of true Epicureanism. 
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 It was only in a Christian world that natural sociability and the 
‘social affections’ had been denied altogether, and only with 
Locke that a moral theory had been constructed upon these 
foundations. In Locke’s hands, Shaftesbury argued, philosophy 
had been denied its role as queen of the sciences, and stripped of 
its fundamental purpose—‘to correct Manners, and regulate 
Lives’.26 Instead men were reduced to necessitous brutes 
continually moved by an uneasiness caused by a desire for 
external objects, from which relief might only be found in the 
uncertain hope of salvation. After all, Locke had followed 
Hobbes in denying that reason alone could acquire a just idea of 
man’s true end (the summum bonum).27 As had Hobbes, Locke 
mocked the claims of both the Stoics and Epicureans that 
philosophy could allow the sage to enjoy a respite from the 
turbulent desires by which most men were held captive. This 
tranquillity and peace (apatheia or ataraxia) might with God’s 
grace be attainable in the world to come, but was certainly not 
within man’s reach in this life and to think otherwise was as vain 
as the effort to which it led was futile. All his philosophical 
enquiries had taught him, Locke declared in a private letter 
written from his deathbed, was that ‘this life is a scene of vanity 
that soon passes away and affords no solid satisfaction but in the 
consciousness of doeing well and in the hopes of another life’.28 
Upon receipt of a transcribed copy of this letter shortly after his 
tutor’s passing, Shaftesbury quipped with distaste that ‘I should 
never have guessed it to have been of a dying philosopher’. In 
response, Shaftesbury penned his own mock-valedictory epistle to 
 
 26 Miscellany III [1711], in Characteristicks, iii, 114. 
 27 Compare John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. 
Nidditch (Oxford, 1975), II.xxi.55, 269–70; with Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. N. 
Malcolm (3 vols., Oxford, 2012), ii, I.xi, 150. 
 28 Locke to Anthony Collins, 23 Aug. 1704, in The Correspondence of John Locke, 
ed. E. S. de Beer (8 vols., Oxford, 1976–89), viii, 417–19 (Locke died on 18 Oct.). For 
this life as a scene of vanity, Ecclesiastes 1:2–18 (to which Locke clearly refers); and 
for a markedly similar use, see Locke’s uncle, Peter’s letter of 17 Sept. 1682: 
Correspondence, ii, #733, 547–50. 
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his ‘disciple’: ‘The use I would have you make of it is, that our 
life, thank heaven, has been a scene of friendship of long 
duration, with much and solid satisfaction, founded on the 
consciousness of doing good for good’s sake, without any farther 
regards…and if this disposition fits me not for heaven, I desire 
never to be fitted for it’.29 In a passage in Characteristicks, drawn 
almost verbatim from this earlier letter, Shaftesbury continued in 
much the same vein: ‘Philosopher! Let me hear concerning what 
is of some moment to me. Let me hear concerning Life; what the 
right notion is; and what I am to stand to, upon occasion: that I 
may not, when Life seems retiring, or has run it-self out to the 
very Dregs, cry Vanity!, condemn the World, and at the same 
time complain, that Life is short and passing!’ Shaftesbury 
characteristically refrained from identifying Locke as the target of 
his disparagement in his published work.30 
 For Shaftesbury, the banishment of the summum bonum and 
denial that philosophy could offer a guide to life reflected the fact 
that those who now laid claim to the title of philosopher no longer 
‘contemplated the Man, as real MAN, and as a human Agent, but 
as a Watch or common Machine’.31 Man was no longer 
considered to be, if only potentially, a rational, autonomous and 
self-legislating moral agent, able to identify and pursue the good. 
From Shaftesbury’s perspective, if empirical natural philosophy 
reduced the world to ‘atoms and chance’, Lockean epistemology 
posited an ‘atomism of the mind’.32 Both Bacon and Locke had 
 
 29 Shaftesbury to Anon., 2 Dec. 1704, in Life, Letters, 344–47. 
 30 Soliloquy, 3.1, 186–87. William Warburton later upbraided Shaftesbury for this 
supposedly cowardly attack on Locke, and interpreted it—not implausibly—as 
indicating the ‘inveterate Rancour he indulged against Christianity’ (Shaftesbury 
described Locke’s letter as akin to ‘one of those dying speeches which come out under 
the title of a Christian warning piece’): The Divine Legation of Moses Demonstrated, on 
the Principles of a Religious Deist (2 vols., London, 1738–41), i, xxii–xxiv. 
 31 Soliloquy, 3.1, 181. 
 32 The phrase ‘atomism of the mind’ is taken from Charles Taylor, Sources of the 
Self: the Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, 1989), 167. 
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sought to combine a distinctly Epicurean (atomistic) account of 
man and nature with the continued defence of religion, whereas 
Epicurus himself had recognised fully that the sole argument for a 
divine intelligence was to be found in man’s good nature and the 
providential order of the universe. It was for this reason that 
‘honest EPICURUS’ had raised ‘his DEITIES aloft in the 
imaginary spaces; and setting ’em apart out of the Universe and 
Nature of Things, makes nothing of ’em beyond a Word’.33 Here 
Shaftesbury’s willingness to ‘answer for [Locke’s] Sincerity as a 
most zealous Christian and Believer’ reads less like a defence of 
Locke’s character than as an explanation of why Locke had seen 
fit to push beyond philosophical ground shared in antiquity by all 
wise men (Stoics as well as Epicureans).34 
 
§2. 
Shaftesbury’s reluctance in his published writings to make public 
the profound nature of his philosophical disagreement with one 
he considered to be his ‘friend and foster-father’ partly explains 
why commentators have not dwelt on the significance and depth 
of the division between the two men.35 Shaftesbury’s reticence 
owed more to their personal ties than to any temperamental 
aversion to philosophical conflict, as his contemptuous treatment 
of Bacon suggests. Shaftesbury’s grandfather had tasked Locke 
with the supervision of Lord Ashley’s education, and his choice 
of tutor (Elizabeth Birch) ensured that the youth acquired an early 
proficiency in Latin and Greek (he was fluent in both by the age 
of eleven).36 Moreover, from an early age it seems that Locke 
discussed philosophical questions directly with his pupil: 
 
 33 The Moralists, a Philosophical Rhapsody [1709], in Characteristicks, ii, [Pt] 2. 
[Sect] 3, 151. 
 34 Shaftesbury to Ainsworth, 3 June 1709, in Several Letters, 39. 
 35 Shaftesbury to Jean Le Clerc, 8 Feb. 1705, in Life, Letters, 332. 
 36 See the ‘Life’ of the third earl, composed by his son the fourth earl, in Life, 
Letters, xix. 
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‘you...conferr’d with me upon Subjects as though you were really 
better for not being alone’.37 As a consequence of his residual 
affection for Locke, Shaftesbury ‘ever concealed my differences’ 
from ‘my old tutor and governor’.38 The only explicit reference to 
Locke in his published works is a positive one.39 Nonetheless it is 
clear from Shaftesbury’s correspondence that, by 1694 at the 
latest, he recognised those differences to be fundamental. 
 In the sole letter in which Shaftesbury discussed, in rambling 
terms, his own philosophical ideas with Locke, written in 1694, 
he noted that ‘what I count True Learning, and all that wee can 
profitt by, is to know ourselves’. Unless it showed men how they 
might be ‘Honester or Better Creatures’ philosophy was both 
useless and pernicious. All too many modern philosophers, like 
the ancient sophists denounced by Socrates, were ‘curiose in what 
signify’d nothing’. Their philosophy ‘gives a Man no help in the 
persuance of what he has learnt to bee his Duty; Assists him not 
in the Government of the Irrationall and Brutall Part of himself; 
which neither makes him more truly satisfy’d with what God does 
in the World (for that is Loving God) nor more Sociable more 
Honest or more Just, by removing of those Passions which hee 
has allways to Struggle with, that he may preserve himself so’.40  
 The primary purpose of philosophy was to allow the individual 
to attain a stable sense of self-worth. Shaftesbury explored this at 
length the Askēmata: ‘How goes the world?—No matter; but how 
go I? This is a matter, and the only matter. This is of concern. 
This mine, and at my peril.—How do I govern? The world?—No. 
But how do I govern MYSELF?—How do matters stand with 
 
 37 Shaftesbury to Locke, 3 Mar. 1692, in Locke, Correspondence, iv, 403–5; and 
Life, Letters, 288–89. Shaftesbury’s claim is supported by a letter of 31 July 1689, 
which refers to their discussion of the subject of the immateriality of the soul: Locke, 
Correspondence, iii, 666–71. 
 38 Shaftesbury to Stanhope, 7 Nov. 1709, in Life, Letters, 416. 
 39 Moralists, 2.4, 161 n. 
 40 Shaftesbury to Locke, 29 Sept. 1694, in Locke, Correspondence, v, 150–54. 
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me?’41 In an entry from 1699, later reproduced verbatim in 
Soliloquy (1710), it is made clear that Shaftesbury considered a 
philosophy that occupied itself with ‘the formation of ideas, their 
comparisons, agreement and disagreement’ as a peculiarly 
modern form of sophistry.42 Concerned solely with men’s 
‘opinions’ or ‘principles’, it failed to recognise that these were 
themselves dictated by men’s ‘TASTE, or Relish in the Concerns 
of Life’ (in other words, their estimations of where happiness was 
to be found). In erecting his moral theory on the basis of his new 
way of ideas, Locke’s efforts were ‘wasted Labour’.43 
 Shaftesbury returned to Horace in order to develop the 
contention that was fundamental to his repudiation of Lockean 
epistemology and moral theory. Horace, along with all the 
disciples of the ‘severe Philosophy’ (Stoicism), had brought 
‘Passion…under the Head of Opinion’.44 It was men’s ‘Temper’, 
‘Fancies’ or ‘Affections’ that governed their ‘Opinions’ and 
‘Principles’. Crucially, this was as true in matters of religion as in 
those of morality. Unless the individual were able to interrogate 
his appetites and subordinate them to the ‘magisterial’ authority 
of reason, he must lead ‘a Life distracted, incoherent, full of 
 
 41 ‘Political Affairs’, in Life, Letters, 102. Klein dismisses the Askēmata as the 
product of an ‘existential crisis’ from which Shaftesbury supposedly emerged in the 
1700s, which steadfastly ignores his continual (if studiously elliptical) advocacy of ‘the 
severe philosophy’ and his repeated self-description as a ‘formalist’ or ‘dogmatist’: 
Culture of Politeness, 70–80. For a still valuable corrective, see E. A. Tiffany, 
‘Shaftesbury as a Stoic’, Publications of the Modern Language Association, 38 (1923): 
642–84. 
 42 ‘Philosophy’, in Life, Letters, 267; Soliloquy, 3.1, 184–85. 
 43 Miscellany III, 109. 
 44 Sensus Communis, 3.1, 65 n. Shaftesbury also composed a Latin manuscript in 
c.1706, which offered a reconstruction of the Stoic theory of the passions to establish 
precisely this point. It has now been published as ‘Pathologia, A Theory of the 
Passions’, ed. L. Jaffro, C. Maurer and A. Petit, History of European Ideas, 39 (2013), 
221–40. 
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Irresolution, Repentance, and Self-disapprobation’.45 Such an 
individual would lack any stable sense of ‘Self’, unable to acquire 
the constancy of temper upon which depended ‘that Uniformity 
of Opinion which is necessary to hold us to one Will, and 
preserve us in the same mind, from one day to another’. 
Philosophy was for Shaftesbury ‘severe’ precisely because it 
required men ‘to be thus magisterial with our-selves; thus strict 
over our Imaginations, and with all the airs of a real Pedagogue to 
be sollicitously taken up in the sour Care and Tutorage of so 
many boyish Fancys, unlucky Appetites and Desires, which are 
perpetually playing truant, and need Correction’.46 Unless one 
subordinated one’s recalcitrant ‘Fancys’ to reason, one would 
remain always captive to them, and transported to inherently 
unstable joy or despair by the slings and arrows of outrageous 
fortune.  
 In the ‘rotten’ modern age, however, men were discouraged 
from exercising such self-discipline. Shaftesbury repeatedly 
expressed his frustration with those ‘polite’ gentlemen who were 
incapable of ‘reasoning expresly and purposely, without play or 
trifling, for two or three hours together, on mere PHILOSOPHY 
and MORALS’.47 ‘Who’, Shaftesbury asked rhetorically, ‘is so 
just to himself, as to recal his FANCY from the power of Fashion 
and Education, to that of REASON?’48 By affirming Hobbes’s 
hedonic account of human motivation and legislative view of 
ethics, and endorsing his scornful assessment of Stoic moral 
philosophy, Locke appeared to deny that men could or should 
make any such attempt at moral self-governance. In this regard 
Locke’s philosophy perfectly suited a ‘Refin’d, Polite, 
and…Deliciouse Age’ in which ‘in a little time neither the name 
 
 45 Miscellany V [1711], in Characteristicks, iii, 185–86. 
 46 Soliloquy 1.2, 116. 
 47 Miscellany V, 176. 
 48 Miscellany III, 114. 
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of Socrates, or Epictetus or Marcus, [will] remain’.49 It was 
because he lived in such a degenerate age, Shaftesbury claimed, 
that he was forced to resort to a multiplicity of literary forms in 
Characteristicks. The analogy between aesthetic taste and 
morality, Shaftesbury confessed, was likewise intended to ‘serve 
instead as an agreeable vehicle for the moral potion, which by 
itself is become mere physic and loathsome to mankind, so as to 
require a little sweetening to help it down’.50 Here again Horace 
served as a model given that he, too, had lived in a degenerate 
and decadent period. Horace had similarly been compelled 
‘artfully’ to conceal ‘his rigid philosophy’, giving it an ‘air of 
raillery’ which might secure it an audience at Maecenas’s court.51 
 In a further letter to Locke of 1694, Shaftesbury alluded to a 
project upon which he was engaged, but which he refused to 
show Locke or to publish ‘in such a Turn of an Age and Time as 
this present one’. His thoughts, he felt, would be dismissed as 
‘either too ridiculously Absurd, or too odiously true’.52 He 
referred to An Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit, which was 
finally published (perhaps against his wishes) in 1699, and later 
incorporated with largely stylistic revisions into Characteristicks 
(1711).53 This work can be read not merely as a direct response to 
 
 49 Shaftesbury to Locke, 8 Sept. 1694, in Locke, Correspondence, v, 123–25; 
‘Human Affairs’, in Life, Letters, 76. 
 50 Shaftesbury to Coste, 25 July 1712, in Life, Letters, 503–4. On this analogy, see 
Daniel Carey, Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson: Contesting Diversity in the 
Enlightenment and Beyond (Cambridge, 2006), 98–149; Timothy M. Costelloe, The 
British Aesthetic Tradition from Shaftesbury to Wittgenstein (Cambridge, 2013), 11–21; 
and Dabney Townsend, ‘From Shaftesbury to Kant: The Development of the Concept 
of Aesthetic Experience’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 48 (1987): 287–306. 
 51 Shaftesbury to Coste, 1 Oct. 1706, in Life, Letters, 363–65. 
 52 Shaftesbury to Locke, 8 Sept. 1694, in Locke, Correspondence, v, 123–25; Life, 
Letters, 296–99. 
 53 In the Characteristicks of 1711, Shaftesbury suggested the Inquiry was published 
in 1699 as ‘an unshapen foetus or false birth’ (Miscellany V, 419), and the fourth earl 
claimed that John Toland had it printed without its author’s consent (Life, Letters, 
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Locke’s Essay, but more specifically to the second edition 
published in 1694.54 This contention is supported by 
Shaftesbury’s focus on two specific questions, which were 
foregrounded by Locke in 1694.  
 The first concerned the central place of ‘uneasiness’ in Locke’s 
hedonic account of human action, of both thought and deed. 
Locke had initially suggested that human action was motivated by 
a broadly rational concern for the ‘greater good’.55 This, however, 
had raised a difficulty, which Locke addressed in the second 
edition of the work. If this were true, how could one explain the 
curious fact that most Christians lived as though oblivious of 
what was, by far, their greatest good and happiness: the eternal 
rewards on offer in a world to come?56 In 1694, Locke more 
unequivocally endorsed his insight that men were driven by their 
passions, particularly by pleasure and pain, which tended to 
prioritise proximate over more distant objects. Without the 
stimulus provided by the ‘unease’ that resulted from ‘a desire for 
 
xxiii). This is questionable, not least since Shaftesbury encouraged Pierre Desmaizeaux 
to translate the work into French in 1701: see Robert Voitle, The Third Earl of 
Shaftesbury, 1671–1713 (London, 1984), 133–35; Isabel Rivers, Reason, Grace, and 
Sentiment: a Study of the Language of Religion and Ethics in England, 1660–1780 (2 
vols., Cambridge, 1991–2000), ii, 100–1; and General Dictionary, ix, 180. A. O. 
Aldridge, ‘Two Versions of Shaftesbury’s Inquiry concerning Virtue’, Huntington 
Library Quarterly, 13 (1950): 207–14, compares the two editions. 
 54 Voitle similarly dates the Inquiry to 1694 on the basis of Shaftesbury’s letters to 
Locke and reads it primarily as a response to the Essay, but makes no mention of the 
important revisions Locke made to his second edition: Third Earl of Shaftesbury, 59–
70. Klein ignores Voitle’s suggestion and dates the work to the late 1690s, without 
providing any substantiation for his claim: Culture of Politeness, 48–49. Birch 
suggested that a ‘rough draft’ of the work was sketched even earlier, ‘when he was but 
twenty years of age’ (c.1691), a suggestion which is not implausible even as there is no 
other corroborating evidence: General Dictionary, ix, 180. 
 55 In the first edition, the section appears at II.xxi.28–38 (II.xxi.28–60 in the second 
edition). It is printed by Nidditch in the notes, running concurrently beneath the main 
text. 
 56 William Molyneux was quick to bring this problem—and its implications—to 
Locke’s attention: Molyneux to Locke, 22 Dec. 1692, in Locke, Correspondence, iv, 
599–602.  
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Happiness, and an aversion to Misery’, Locke argued, men would 
remain idle as though ‘in a lazy lethargick Dream’.57 This was 
directly contradicted by Shaftesbury: ‘To love, and to be kind; to 
have social or natural Affection, Complacency and Good-will, is 
to feel immediate Satisfaction and genuine Content. ’Tis in it-self 
original Joy, depending on no preceding Pain or Uneasiness; and 
producing nothing beside Satisfaction merely’ (I 2.2.3, 96).58  
 The second question was intimately related to the first. This 
concerned the centrality of a future state in Locke’s theory of 
moral obligation. The fundamental objective of the Inquiry was to 
expose the chimerical nature of any attempt to establish what 
Spellman refers to as ‘the origins of universal morality’ in the 
uncertain ‘hope’ of reward in a future state.59  
 In this regard Shaftesbury claimed that the distinction Locke 
drew between moral motivation and obligation was untenable. 
The ‘true’ foundation of moral obligation in God’s law and the 
additional motivation to virtue provided by eternal sanctions had, 
Locke argued, been revealed rather than discovered. In this regard 
the Christian revelation had provided what the ancient 
philosophers had claimed but failed to offer—a compelling 
account of moral obligation, a point later developed by Locke at 
considerably greater length in the Reasonableness of Christianity 
(1695). Yet those who had not heard the Word might still live 
broadly in accordance with the law of nature, even if they were 
motivated to do so by two other, man-made laws: the ‘Law of 
Reputation’ and the ‘Civil Law’.60 ‘It must be allowed’, Locke 
 
 57 Locke, Essay, I.ii.3; II.vii.3. 
 58 An Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit [1699], in Characteristicks, ii: 
references to Book, Part, Section and page number are given in brackets in the text. 
 59 Spellman, Locke and Depravity, 201. 
 60 On this, see especially Locke, Essay, II.xxviii.11. For a discussion of Locke’s 
‘three laws’, see James Tully, ‘Governing Conduct’, in E. Leites (ed.), Conscience and 
Casuistry in Early-Modern Europe (Cambridge, 1988), 12–71, reprinted in id., An 
Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts (Cambridge, 1993), 179–241. 
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had argued, ‘that several Moral Rules, may receive, from 
Mankind, a very general Approbation, without either knowing, or 
admitting the true ground of Morality’. Because God in His 
goodness had, ‘by an inseparable Connexion, joined Virtue and 
publick Happiness together’, what was found publicly useful 
informed these man-made laws in ways which rendered them 
broadly consistent with God’s (revealed) will, even as men had 
remained ignorant of the latter.61 Divine design, then, ensured that 
utility (utile) and truth (honestum), reason and revelation were 
entirely consistent with one another. This was a point, Locke 
repeatedly intimated, which Cicero as an academic sceptic—a 
tradition of philosophy the existence of which Shaftesbury denied 
in his letter to Coste—had recognised in placing utility at the 
heart of his explanation of moral duties in De Officiis.62 Whereas 
Cicero had illustrated the public and private benefits that resulted 
from the performance of moral duties, the Gospels, ‘soaring 
beyond the Reach of Reason’, had revealed why all men were 
obligated to perform them.63  
 For Shaftesbury, Locke’s increasing willingness precariously 
to ground moral obligation and the possibility of a normative 
ethic upon articles of faith—the existence of God and a future 
state—which Locke himself had done notably little to establish 
 
 61 Locke, Essay, I.iii.6. For important discussion of how a divine teleology 
structured all aspects of Locke’s thinking, see especially Ian Harris, The Mind of John 
Locke (Cambridge, 1994); and Timothy Stanton, ‘Natural Law, Nonconformity, and 
Toleration: Two Stages on Locke’s Way’, in J. Parkin & T. Stanton (eds.), Natural Law 
and Toleration in the Early Enlightenment (Oxford, 2013), 25–57. 
 62 For insightful discussion of Locke’s esteem for De Officiis, see Phillip Mitsis, 
‘Locke’s Offices’, in J. Miller and B. Inwood (eds.), Hellenistic and Early Modern 
Philosophy (Cambridge, 2003), 45–61. A more comprehensive discussion of Locke’s 
interpretation of Cicero will be offered in my From Moral Theology to Moral 
Philosophy: Cicero, Christianity and Visions of Mankind from Locke to Hume 
(Forthcoming, Oxford 2017), ch. 1. 
 63 The Reasonableness of Christianity [1695], in V. Nuovo (ed.), Writings on 
Religion (Oxford, 2002), 89–210, at 203–4. 
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by reasoned argument was disastrous.64 Locke’s account of moral 
motivation, meanwhile, suggested that in practice it was the 
historically-contingent and mutable dictates of custom and 
positive law which guided most men’s moral conduct. Locke 
offered a moral theology which suggested that ‘Experience and 
our Catechism teaches us all’: a position which Shaftesbury set 
out to undermine.65 ‘There can be nothing more fatal to virtue’, 
Shaftesbury declared in the Inquiry, ‘than the weak and uncertain 
Belief of a future Reward and Punishment. For the stress being 
laid wholly here, if this Foundation come to fail, there is no 
further Prop or Security to Mens Morals. And thus Virtue is 
supplanted and betray’d’ (I 1.3.3, 39–40).  
 By proposing to consider ‘Virtue’ and ‘Religion’ separately, 
which were ‘generally presum’d inseparable Companions’, 
Shaftesbury sought to uncover the fundamental error at the heart 
of Locke’s moral theory (I 1.1.1, 3). As his index entry for 
‘Philosophy’ attests, Shaftesbury’s overarching objective was to 
challenge the ‘Unhappy Mixture or Conjunction of Philosophy 
with Religion’ which had occurred in a Christian world, and to 
expose the ‘Monstrous Issue and Product of this Union’.66 This 
led Shaftesbury to consider the question of ‘whether it be a true 
Saying, That it is impossible for an Atheist to be virtuous, or 
share any real degree of Honesty, or MERIT’ (I 1.1.1, 4). This 
had been raised in characteristically provocative fashion by Pierre 
Bayle, an acquaintance of Locke and later Shaftesbury, in his 
 
 64 More recent commentators have similarly considered Locke’s ethical theory to be 
a ‘tragic’ failure, ‘incoherent’ and ‘broken-backed’, for much the same reason: see 
especially John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke: an Historical Account of 
the Argument of the Two Treatises on Government (Cambridge, 1969), 81, 187, 221; 
and John Marshall, John Locke: Resistance, Religion and Responsibility (Cambridge, 
1994), 157. 
 65 Shaftesbury to Ainsworth, 3 June 1709, in Several Letters, 39–41. 
 66 Characteristicks, iii, 280, s.v. ‘Philosophy’. 
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Pensées Diverses sur la Comète (1680; 1683).67 Locke engaged 
with this issue only indirectly: he explained how men might live 
tolerably moral lives without knowledge of God and His plan; yet 
without this knowledge the obligatory nature of the moral duties 
could not be comprehended, and those who denied the existence 
of the Creator a priori undermined the bonds of society and had 
no right to toleration.68 Shaftesbury occupied a position much 
closer to Bayle’s, arguing that men’s conduct depended on their 
affections rather than their professed speculative principles. 
Establishing that men’s ‘Opinions’ or ‘Principles’ were 
dependent upon their ‘Desires’, Shaftesbury proceeded to argue 
that only if the latter were to some degree fixed might the 
individual be able to entertain a steady belief in both a divine 
intelligence and perhaps the prospect of a future state.69 
Philosophy, in other words, must necessarily precede theology. It 
was ‘Philosophy, which, by Nature, has the Pre-eminence above 
all other Science and Knowledg’, and ‘[b]y this Science Religion 
it-self is judg’d’.70 It was philosophy alone that could lead men to 
recognise the capacity of an intelligent mind to establish a 
harmony and order within themselves and, by analogy, in the 
 
 67 Shaftesbury would appear to have made Bayle’s acquaintance during his first 
retreat in Rotterdam in 1698–9: Voitle, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, 86–91. For the 
importance of Bayle’s question for the broader development of eighteenth-century 
moral philosophy, see John Robertson, The Case for the Enlightenment: Scotland and 
Naples 1680–1760 (Cambridge, 2005). 
 68 Locke, ‘An Essay concerning Toleration’ (1667), and A Letter concerning 
Toleration (1689), in Political Writings, ed. D. Wootton (Indianapolis, 1993), 188, 426. 
For Locke’s complex treatment of this subject, see J. K. Numao, ‘Locke on Atheism’, 
History of Political Thought, 34 (2013), 252–72. On Locke’s indirect engagement with 
Bayle, see Harris, Mind of Locke, 190–1, 280–89. 
 69 In due course Shaftesbury would make it clear that he did not consider 
immortality to be taught by true (Socratic) philosophy: see below, 196–98. It is likely 
that he had reached this conclusion—with the assistance of his Stoic guides like 
Aurelius—by 1694. This is suggested by his comments on the subject in his exchange 
with Locke, referred to above, n. 37. 
 70 Soliloquy, 3.1, 183–84. 
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universe as a whole.  
 Here Shaftesbury identified two antithetical cosmologies, 
which gave rise to contrasting estimations of what it was for a 
man to live according to his nature—the central question of 
philosophy. ‘In the Whole of Things (or in the Universe)’, 
Shaftesbury contended, ‘either all is according to a good Order, 
and the most agreeable to a general Interest: or there is that which 
is otherwise, and might possibly have been better constituted, 
more wisely contriv’d, and with more advantage to the general 
Interest of Beings, or of the Whole’. If—as Bayle’s treatment of 
theodicy implied—one considered the universe to be in any sense 
‘defective’, one could hardly sustain the idea of ‘a designing 
Principle or Mind’ as the ‘Cause of all things’, or locate man’s 
‘End’ and happiness ‘in Nature’. One would instead be compelled 
to consider man in lowlier terms, rather than as a ‘Part’ of a 
coherent larger ‘Whole’ (I 1.1.2, 5–6). 
 Shaftesbury identified the ‘perfect THEIST’ as the individual 
who ‘at all Seasons, and on all Occasions’ was able to support the 
‘Belief of a supreme Wisdom’. The ‘perfect ATHEIST’ was 
similarly able to ‘think always consistently’ on the question, but 
reached the opposite conclusion regarding order and design, and 
consequently dismissed the notion of an intelligent ordering mind 
altogether. In setting out these diametrically opposed ideal 
standpoints, Shaftesbury re-established the irreconcilable division 
between Stoicism and Epicureanism which he later discussed in 
his letter to Coste. Shaftesbury provided an ‘OEconomy of the 
Passions’ which vindicated both the Stoic and Epicurean sage. He 
argued that there were two ‘sorts’ of ‘Affections’ natural to man. 
These were the ‘social’, which led the individual to exert himself 
within society; and the ‘selfish’ or ‘private’, which ensured that 
he did not lose sight of what was required for his immediate self-
preservation. These two types of ‘Affection’ could potentially 
pull in different directions, and a man’s view of happiness and his 
true interest varied according to the strength of each. As such, it 
was entirely valid to ask which ought to be preferred, and to seek 
to suppress those that led him away from what he thereby 
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identified as being his ‘true Scope or End’. As Shaftesbury would 
later note in Sensus Communis (1709), a work which developed 
many of the arguments propounded in the Inquiry, ‘’tis the height 
of Wisdom, no doubt, to be rightly selfish’.  
 The question remained as to where one’s true interest lay. This 
required the individual to perform the act seemingly discouraged 
by Locke, and employ his reason to identify his true end and 
happiness (the summum bonum):  
 
For in this we shou’d all agree, that Happiness was to be pursu’d, and in 
fact was always sought after: but whether found in following Nature and 
giving way to common Affection; or in suppressing it, and turning every 
Passion towards private Advantage, a narrow Self-end, or the Preservation 
of mere Life; this wou’d be the matter in debate between us. The Question 
wou’d not be, “Who lov’d himself, or Who not”; but “Who lov’d and 
serv’d himself the rightest, and after the truest manner”.71 
 
Until this was resolved, the individual remained in a liminal state. 
He experienced ‘the frequent Successions of alternate Hatred and 
Love, Aversion and Inclination’, which ‘must of necessity create 
continual Disturbance and Disgust’, repentance and remorse (I 
2.2.1, 64).  
 Only the ‘two real distinct philosophies’ that were espoused by 
the ‘perfect THEIST’ and the ‘perfect ATHEIST’ provided rules 
by which to establish that constancy of temper which could lead a 
man to a stable sense of self and to a just conformity between his 
principles and his conduct. The ‘perfect ATHEIST’ had a stable 
sense of self. Even as he was incapable of ‘Virtue’, his constancy 
of temper ensured that he remained the same man from one 
moment to the next, an essential prerequisite for friendship and 
mutual trust.  
 Shaftesbury conceded that he could not be relied upon to the 
same degree as the ‘perfect THEIST’, however. He would 
eventually discover that his attempt to suppress his ‘social’ 
affections was futile, and be thrown back into a maelstrom of 
 
 71 Sensus Communis, 3.3, 76. 
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melancholic bitterness and resentment (I 2.2.1, 74–75). 
Nonetheless he did not positively advocate principles or practices 
that were destructive of human society. True Epicurean 
philosophy advocated ‘a steddy and deliberate Pursuit of the most 
narrowly confin’d Self-interest’. It necessarily led the individual 
to withdraw from society, but there was no reason why it would 
lead him actively to seek to disrupt it (I 2.1.1, 46). As Shaftesbury 
noted, ‘when Men are easy in themselves, they let others remain 
so; and can readily comply with what seems plausible, and is 
thought conducing to the Quiet or good Correspondence of 
Mankind’.72 
 Only the ‘perfect THEIST’ (the Stoic sage) was capable of 
truly virtuous action in Shaftesbury’s austere account. His virtue 
was clearly not a consequence of his theism, rather the opposite. 
His recognition that his true ‘End’ and happiness were to be 
realised in society (interpreted in the broadest terms as 
‘mankind’) was not the consequence of ‘dry reasoning’. 
Shaftesbury made notably little effort to defend his cosmic 
optimism on the grounds of ‘right reason’—a term that scarcely 
appears in his writings—or his belief in a divine intelligence on 
the argument from design. Here he departed significantly from his 
Stoic guides.73 Instead it was to sentiment that Shaftesbury 
appealed in an account that was radically subjectivist in intent. 
Shaftesbury exhorted his reader to ‘Converse with himself’. If he 
did so, he would recognise that all enjoyment came from a settled 
temper free of bitterness, and that this could only be acquired if 
he reconciled himself to providence (meaning external fortune) 
and learnt to despise those external ‘things’ that were not in his 
 
 72 Miscellany II, 68. 
 73 A point noted by Taylor, Sources of the Self, 249–59. On the changing valences 
of the concept of ‘right reason’ in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries, 
see John Spurr, ‘“Rational Religion” in Restoration England’, Journal of the History of 
Ideas, 49 (1988), 563–85. 
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‘power’.74  
 Through this process of self-examination, the individual would 
be led to affirm that ‘there is no State of outward Prosperity, or 
flowing Fortune, where Inclination and Desire are always 
satisfy’d, Fancy and Humour pleas’d’ (I 2.2.1, 66). Rather than 
experiencing excessive joy or melancholy due to external 
circumstances, Shaftesbury argued that he would recognise that 
all that matters is what passes within. He would discover with a 
degree of ‘Evidence as great as that which is found in Numbers, 
or Mathematicks’—here Shaftesbury aped Locke’s 
terminology—that it is in the pleasures of the mind rather than the 
senses that the greatest and most constant contentment is to be 
found (I, ‘Conclusion’, 99). The mind took pleasure in order, 
harmony and ease (apatheia); and this could only be achieved 
through the (temperate) exercise of those social affections which 
lead a man to ‘love and serve’ (the Shaftesbury family motto). 
The just philosopher would act virtuously because he recognised 
that it was in his nature to do so; because his greatest interest lay 
in realising his true nature, in this higher sense virtue and interest 
were united.  
 Insofar as Shaftesbury endorsed a concept of ‘moral sense’ it 
must be understood in this light, as the supposedly universal 
desire of men for a happiness defined as a stable sense of self that 
could only result from ‘the Order or Symmetry of this inward 
Part’ (I, 2.1.2, 48).75 In Shaftesbury’s reformulation of core Stoic 
arguments, it was the arduous attempt to understand one’s true 
end (the summum bonum) that led one both to acquiesce with 
what appeared to be an unjust external world of men 
(‘providence’), and to recognise and worship a perfectly wise and 
 
 74 Shaftesbury’s concept of providence is, like that of Aurelius, considerably closer 
to Machiavelli’s fortuna than to Locke’s Christianised and teleological concept. 
 75 On the concept of the ‘moral sense’ in Shaftesbury, see Stephen Darwall, British 
Moralists and the Internal ‘Ought’, 1640–1740 (Cambridge, 1995), 176–206; Michael 
B. Prince, ‘Mimetic Virtue. On Shaftesbury’s Moral Sense’, Aufklärung, 22 (2010), 59–
76; and Robert Voitle, ‘Shaftesbury’s Moral Sense’, Studies in Philology, 52 (1955), 
17–38. 
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benevolent divine being. ‘Perfect THEISM’ was the final and 
inevitable consequence of this search for contentment. The 
‘divine Passion’ to which this gave rise further strengthened the 
love of order and harmony that the virtuous man had already 
attained within (I 1.3.3, 43). 
 Leslie Stephen’s claim that Shaftesbury possessed an ‘easy 
optimism’ in his theodicy and vision of human nature requires 
qualification.76 It was made clear in the Inquiry, and even more so 
in the Askēmata, that both the ‘perfect THEIST’ and the ‘perfect 
ATHEIST’ were ideal types. It was quite possible that no such 
sages had ever lived.77 ‘Vice and Virtue’, Shaftesbury noted, ‘are 
found variously mix’d and alternately prevalent in the several 
Characters of Mankind’, and ‘it is as hard to find a Man wholly 
Ill, as wholly Good’ (I 1.2.4, 22–23). Although all men possessed 
a ‘favourable Inclination’ towards virtue, its realisation depended 
upon ‘a use of Reason, sufficient to secure a right application of 
the Affections’ (I 1.2.3, 20). Very few men could be truly 
virtuous or genuine theists; and men had to struggle and labour to 
‘become natural’. Almost all would ‘come short of that sound and 
well-establish’d Reason, which alone can constitute a just 
Affection, a uniform and steddy Will and Resolution’ (I 1.2.4, 22). 
The constant flux most men experienced between ‘Love and 
Hatred, Aversion and Inclination’ was reflected in their ideas of a 
deity (or deities). Most were ‘DAEMONISTS’, possessed of an 
idea of divinity that was less than perfectly good (I 1.1.2, 5–8). 
For this reason, in matters of worship, ‘all Moralists, worthy of 
any Name’ (meaning the Stoics) had ‘prescrib’d Restraint, 
press’d Moderation, and, to all TYRO’s in Philosophy forbid the 
forward Use of Admiration, Rapture or Extasy’.78 Since novices 
 
 76 Leslie Stephen, English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, 2nd edn (2 vols., 
London, 1881), ii, 18–33. 
 77 The conception of the sage as representing a moral ideal by leading an 
unblemished life was a conventional Stoic claim: see Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of 
Life, 56–59. 
 78 Miscellany II, 24. 
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in philosophy lacked a stable and constant idea of the good, they 
might end up admiring a being that was as capricious and 
arbitrary as the succession of fancies they experienced within. 
The ‘Moderation’ of Stoic moralists discouraged the erection of 
false models for admiration. 
 This, for Shaftesbury, was evidently not true in a Christian age. 
He identified a third ‘sort’ of affections, the ‘unnatural’, which 
could lead men against both the interest of mankind and self-
interest. Such ‘unnatural’ affections were artificially inculcated 
through custom and education in societies where false and 
pernicious ideas in religion prevailed. ‘Honest Epicurus’, 
banishing the gods, had in no sense cultivated these. As 
Shaftesbury continually noted in the Askēmata, drawing from 
Aurelius: ‘Either atoms or Deity. No medium. That multiplicity 
or this simplicity. No compromise—anarchy, or monarchy’.79 The 
‘perfect ATHEIST’ was capable of a ‘real degree of Honesty or 
Merit’ because he was able to attain a ‘real degree’ of tranquillity 
and self-mastery. His was a philosophically-tenable position, and 
Epicureanism a ‘real distinct’ philosophy. The inculcation of a 
religion erected on a ‘medium’ between ‘atoms or Deity’, 
however, compelled men to remain in a continual state of unease 
and self-disapprobation. Shaftesbury drew upon Plutarch’s On 
Superstition—a favourite text for freethinkers—to make this 
point: 
 
The Atheist believes there is no Deity; the Religionist, or superstitious 
Believer, wishes there were none. If he believes, ’tis against his Will: 
mistrust he dares not, nor call his Thought in question. But cou’d he with 
Security, at once, throw off that oppressive Fear, which like the Rock of 
TANTALUS impends, and presses over him, he wou’d with equal Joy 
spurn his inslaving Thought, and embrace the Atheist’s State and Opinion 
as his happiest Deliverance. Atheists are free of Superstition, but the 
Superstitious are ever willing Atheists, tho impotent in their Thought, and 
 
 79 ‘Life’, in Life, Letters, 254; citing Aurelius, Meditations, trans. M. Hammond & 
D. Clay (London, 2006), 4.3.2n, 6.4n. 
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unable to believe of the Divine Being as they gladly wou’d.80 
 
This ‘corrupt Religion, or SUPERSTITION’ was alone able to 
impose ‘many things the most horridly unnatural and inhuman’ as 
‘excellent, good, and laudable in themselves’ (I 1.3.2, 27). 
Shaftesbury’s prime example was ‘Misanthropy’, defined as ‘the 
immediate Opposite to that noble Affection, which, in ancient 
Language, was term’d Hospitality, viz. extensive Love of 
Mankind, and Relief of Strangers’ (I 2.2.3, 95). This profoundly 
‘unnatural’ affection resulted from the erection and imposition on 
men’s minds of a model for admiration who exhibited such a 
quality. Although obnoxious to men’s natural sense of what was 
‘just and equitable’, through ‘Art and strong Endeavour, with 
long Practice and Meditation’ a ‘second Nature’ could be created 
which obliterated the original (I 1.3.1, 25).81 Men were naturally 
predisposed to the passion of ‘Admiration’ for that which was 
greater than themselves. The ‘divine Passion’ of the ‘perfect 
THEIST’ was so beneficial because it was directed towards a 
‘true Model and Example of the most exact Justice, and highest 
Goodness and Worth’ (I 1.3.2, 29). However: 
 
If there be a Religion which teaches the Adoration and Love of a GOD, 
whose Character it is to be captious, and of high resentment, subject to 
Wrath and Anger, furious, revengeful; and revenging himself, when 
offended, on others than those who gave the Offence: and if there be added 
to the Character of this GOD, a fraudulent Disposition, encouraging Deceit 
and Treachery amongst Men; favourable to a few, tho for slight causes, and 
 
 80 Miscellany II, 78 n. For freethinking appeals to Plutarch, see Justin Champion, 
The Pillars of Priestcraft Shaken: the Church of England and its Enemies, 1660–1730 
(Cambridge, 1992), 215 n. 50. 
 81 The idea of custom as a second nature (consuetudo altera natura) can be traced 
back at least as far as Aristotle. The claim that it could destroy man’s original nature 
entirely, however, was a more recent claim, advanced by Blaise Pascal (‘la coutûme est 
une second nature qui detruit la première’: Pensées, # 93). For a concise overview, 
Donald R. Kelley, ‘Altera Natura: The Idea of Custom in Historical Perspective’, in J. 
Henry & S. Hutton (eds.), New Perspectives on Renaissance Thought (London, 1990), 
83–100; and Michael Moriarty, Early Modern French Thought: The Age of Suspicion 
(Oxford, 2003), 126–51. 
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cruel to the rest: ’tis evident that such a Religion as this being strongly 
enforc’d, must of necessity raise even an Approbation and Respect towards 
the Vices of this kind, and breed a suitable Disposition, a capricious, 
partial, revengeful, and deceitful Temper (I, 1.3.2, 28). 
 
Shaftesbury alluded here to Calvinist theology, the doctrine of the 
Fall and Adam’s imputed sin, in which ‘one Person were decreed 
to suffer for another’s fault’ (I 1.3.2, 29). 
 Adam Smith argued that it was Shaftesbury’s ‘Puritan’ 
education that gave his philosophy ‘a different turn’, and the 
Askēmata offers support for this interpretation.82 In his claim that 
devotional exercises could ‘be of ill consequence and even fatal’ 
to virtue, Shaftesbury reflected on his own concerted struggle to 
expurgate all remnants of his religious education: 
 
Consider the age, vulgar religion, how thou hast been bred, and what 
impressions yet remaining of that sordid, shameful, nauseous idea of Deity 
[...] and what a wretched effect this has within [...] Therefore if thou 
wouldst praise, worship and adore aright, wait till other habits are 
confirmed and until other ideas of a certain kind are worn off, as they will 
be when the whole scope of life is changed; aims, aversions, inclinings and 
declining reversed, transferred; the whole thought, mind, purpose, will, 
differently modelled, new. Then it is that thou mayest soundly, 
unaffectedly and safely sing those hymns to God which the divine man 
mentions.83 
 
‘The divine man’ was Epictetus, and as the Askēmata testifies it 
was to his writings as well as those of Aurelius that Shaftesbury 
turned in order to find those exemplars worthy of just admiration 
and to model himself anew.  
 Shaftesbury’s rejection of the strongly Augustinian concept of 
divine grace as the sine qua non for the virtuous life placed him 
 
 82 Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric, 57–58. 
 83 ‘Deity’, in Life, Letters, 24. The moral necessity of purifying oneself of one’s 
recalcitrant passions and inclinations before engaging in acts of worship was 
emphasised by Aurelius and Epictetus, but also by Seneca, Natural Questions, trans. T. 
H. Corcoran (Cambridge, MA, 1971), 2.59. 
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firmly within the mainstream of liberal Restoration Anglicanism 
(and alongside Locke).84 Yet in the Inquiry the thrust of 
Shaftesbury’s argument carried him considerably further. 
Shaftesbury argued that the opinions of one’s neighbours, the 
civil laws, and even the doctrine of a future state (Locke’s ‘three 
Laws’) might potentially instruct men ‘in a Virtue, which 
afterwards they practice upon other grounds, and without thinking 
of a Penalty or Bribe’. The gallows and threat of eternal 
damnation were, however regrettably, necessary for the 
unphilosophical ‘Vulgar’ (the vast majority of mankind), who 
were incapable of leading a life according to reason. They 
encouraged men to ‘discipline’ their wayward affections, even if 
this was not a consequence of reasoning on their true happiness, 
because ‘it is Example which chiefly influences Mankind, and 
forms the Character and Disposition of a People’ (I 1.3.3, 37). 
 Yet the question to which this led was where the most perfect 
examples were ultimately to be found. It is clear that for 
Shaftesbury the answer was unequivocally not the Christian 
scriptures: 
 
And thus it appears, that where a real Devotion and hearty Worship is paid 
to a supreme Being, who in his History or Character is represented 
otherwise than as really and truly just and good; there must ensue a Loss of 
Rectitude, a Disturbance of Thought, and a Corruption of Temper and 
Manners in the Believer (I, 1.3.2, 29; italics added) 
 
In Soliloquy, Shaftesbury made this point even more strongly by 
noting that ‘such are mere human Hearts; that they can hardly 
find the least Sympathy with that only one which had the 
Character of being after the Pattern of the ALMIGHTY’s’. As a 
result ‘there is a certain perverse Humanity in us, which inwardly 
 
 84 The widely-shared hostility to Puritan theology—and nonconformity—within 
Restoration Anglicanism is emphasised by John Spurr, ‘“Latitudinarianism” and the 
Restoration Church’, Historical Journal, 31 (1988), 61–82. This is not to suggest that 
Locke himself was in any sense a ‘mainstream’ Anglican; merely that on the question 
of the need for efficacious grace Locke occupied a position shared by those Anglicans 
who were deeply distrustful of ‘enthusiasm’. 
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resists the Divine Commission, tho ever so plainly reveal’d’.85 
‘That only one’, clearly enough, was Christ.   
 Here Shaftesbury was undercutting the fundamental contention 
made by Locke in the Reasonableness of Christianity: that the 
divinity of Christ was attested by the moral excellence of his 
ministry and doctrines, which were entirely consistent with the 
insights garnered by philosophy even as they soared beyond the 
reach of mere reason. Shaftesbury fully accepted that 
‘GOODNESS is the only Pledg of Truth’, and that this goodness 
had to be measured according to men’s ideas of moral excellence 
as there could be no other standard.86 The ‘sole Measure’ by 
which ‘Religion it-self is judg’d, Spirits are searched, Prophecys 
prov’d, Miracles distinguish’d’ must be ‘taken from moral 
Rectitude, and from the Discernment of what is sound and just in 
the Affections’.87 Yet, as will be discussed in what follows, 
Shaftesbury was clear that the Scriptures (including Christ’s 
ministry and teachings as reported in the Gospels) were quite 
incapable of providing any such pledge. The relationship between 
‘the Rule of Morals’ identified by true philosophy, and the moral 
teachings of Christian theology was antagonistic, rather than 
harmonious as in Locke’s account.88 For Shaftesbury, all revealed 
religions (not least Christianity) were impositions and subverted 
virtue. Their most ‘corrupt’ professors, such as Hobbes and 
Locke, merely served to reveal this fact most clearly. 
 
§3. 
In A Letter concerning Enthusiasm (1708), Shaftesbury defended 
his claim that religions ought not to be excluded from the ‘test’ of 
ridicule on the basis that ‘whatever Humour has got the start, if it 
 
 85 Soliloquy, 3.3, 220. 
 86 Moralists, 2.5, 188. 
 87 Soliloquy, 3.1, 184. 
 88 Ibid. 
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be unnatural, it cannot hold; and the Ridicule, if ill-plac’d at first, 
will certainly fall at last where it deserves’.89 To substantiate this 
claim, advanced throughout Characteristicks, that ‘Nature will 
not be mock’d’, Shaftesbury turned to the example of Socrates.90 
When submitted to the base raillery of Aristophanes in The 
Clouds, ‘the divinest Man who had ever appear’d in the Heathen 
World’ was content to play along, a sure indication that ‘there 
was no Imposture either in his Character or Opinions’.91 The 
‘Ridicule’, as a consequence, fell where it deserved— on 
Aristophanes. This held true for all ‘the well-deserving Antients’. 
The ‘Truth and Reason’ of their productions rendered them 
resistant to mockery. It followed that they ‘will have always a 
strong Party among the Wise and Learned of every Age’.92 It was 
for this reason that the early Church Fathers had eventually met 
with scorn and contempt in their attempts to discredit them. Their 
raillery was returned on them with interest, showing the ‘ill 
Policy as well as Barbarity of this Zealot-Enmity against the 
Works of the Antients’.93 
 For Shaftesbury, the contention that ‘Nature will not be 
mock’d’ was synonymous with the claim that ‘the Works of the 
Antients’ were impervious to raillery: ‘a Hand happily form’d on 
Nature and the Antients’ was one and the same thing.94 
Shaftesbury went to considerable lengths to show that the 
Socratic tradition in philosophy and the Homeric in poetry were 
entirely indigenous to ‘the politest of all Nations’ (ancient 
 
 89 A Letter concerning Enthusiasm [1708], in Characteristicks, i, [Sect] II, 7. 
 90 Soliloquy, 3.3, 218. 
 91 Letter concerning Enthusiasm, III, 20. 
 92 Soliloquy, 2.3, 166. 
 93 Miscellany V, 146 n. 
 94 Soliloquy, 3.3, 209. 
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Greece).95 ‘Every noble Study and Science’ in Greece, 
Shaftesbury emphasised, was ‘self-form’d, wrought out of Nature, 
and drawn from the necessary Operation and Course of things, 
working, as it were, of their own accord, and proper 
inclination’.96 The arts and sciences were able to develop 
‘naturally’ in Greece due to a combination of political liberty and 
artistic emulation. They were ‘free Communitys, made by 
Consent and voluntary Association’. To win an audience, artists 
were required to charm the ear and appeal to the heart. Emulation 
was encouraged between communities that were independent but 
connected by shared trade, language and culture. Homer was the 
‘grand poetick SIRE’, and Socrates the ‘philosophical 
PATRIARCH’, ‘the greatest of Philosophers, the very Founder of 
Philosophy it-self’.97 The ‘vulgar Religion’ of ancient Greece 
originated from the ‘miraculous Narrations’ of the former. In his 
fables Homer drew his characters after ‘the Moral Rule’, and they 
were reflective of ‘the justest Moral Truths, and exhibitive of the 
best Doctrine and Instruction in Life and Manners’. It was for this 
(moral) reason that ‘the wiser and better sort’ respected the 
‘vulgar Religion’, even if they interpreted its narrations 
allegorically. It encouraged men to discipline their affections 
through the fabulous stories it relayed.98  
 In Locke’s account the pagan religion contained no ethical 
content whatsoever.99 For Shaftesbury, conversely, it served a 
 
 95 Miscellany V, 141. For Shaftesbury’s idealised portrayal of ancient Greece, see 
Klein, Culture of Politeness, 199–206. 
 96 Miscellany III, 86. 
 97 Soliloquy, 2.2, 147, 158; Miscellany V, 149. 
 98 Miscellany V, 141, 159 n. 
 99 In the Reasonableness of Christianity, as elsewhere, Locke laboured the point 
that heathen religion in Rome and Greece contained no moral teachings. It was 
philosophers, rather than priests, who professed to instruct men in their moral duties. 
Only with Christ was this division between moral philosophy and divinity finally 
broken down. 
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crucial ethical purpose in reforming men’s moral sentiments. 
Meanwhile, Shaftesbury continued, it was from Socratic origins 
that the various branches or formal variations of philosophy were 
developed, not least the comic (with Antisthenes and Diogenes), 
the sublime and poetic (culminating with Plato), and the 
methodical and analytic (with Aristotle).100 
 The ‘natural’ development of the ‘civil, social, Theistic’ 
philosophy was further emphasised by Shaftesbury in his draft of 
a projected ‘History of Socrates’ (also entitled ‘Chartae 
Socraticae’).101 This manuscript has received regrettably little 
historical attention, but it shines considerable light on 
Shaftesbury’s objectives in his published writings. Shaftesbury 
began work on this manuscript during his first retreat in 
Rotterdam in 1698–9, and returned to it sporadically over the 
following decade.102  
 Shaftesbury recognised his project to be difficult for two, 
related reasons. The first was due to the nature of the sources 
upon which any account of Socrates’ life and teachings had to be 
constructed. As Shaftesbury would later note in Characteristicks, 
Socrates was similar to Christ, the ‘Founder of Philosophy’ and 
‘the Founder of our Religion’, in that neither was a writer.103 
 
 100 Soliloquy, 2.2, 157–60. Here Shaftesbury was clearly working within the 
doxographical tradition established by Diogenes Laertius in his Lives and Opinions of 
Eminent Philosophers, as noted by Klein, Culture of Politeness, 43 n. 45. Nonetheless 
Shaftesbury judged Diogenes harshly, perhaps on account of his praise of Epicurus and 
the sceptics: in the ‘Chartae Socraticae’, Shaftesbury condemned him as ‘an uncorrect 
Writer of no Judgment [speak more modestly]’ (CS 15). 
 101 The National Archives [NA] 30/24/27/14. 
 102 The only concerted, though superficial, discussion of the work is to be found in 
Klein, Culture of Politeness, 107–11. It has now been published, with a useful 
introduction, as Volume V of Series II of Standard Edition: Complete Works, Selected 
Letters and Posthumous Writings, ed. W. Benda, C. Jackson-Holzberg, F. A. Uelhein & 
E. Wolff (Stuttgart, 2008). This edition is not widely available, however, and page 
references (given in brackets in the text) are to the original in the NA. 
 103 Miscellany V, 149–50. A comparison between Christ and Socrates was a staple 
of freethinking assaults on Christian doctrines and institutions. Charles Blount and 
  
197 
They left it to others to compose a written record of their 
character and words. In the case of Socrates, the most thorough 
and contemporaneous accounts were provided by Xenophon and 
Plato, but their reports differed in important respects and the 
question arose as to how (or whether) they might be reconciled.  
 Scholars of classical reception consider what has been termed 
‘the Socratic Problem’ to have arisen only with Brucker, Lessing 
and Mosheim from the mid-eighteenth century, but Shaftesbury 
intended to confront it directly.104  
 The second difficulty concerned the highly controversial 
nature of the fundamental message Shaftesbury intended to 
convey in the work. This was that as ‘the Antients excel us in 
Policy & Government so in the knowledg of this sort (viz. 
morals) they were not less happily knowing’. Two notes were 
added in the margin: ‘speak modestly’, and ‘take care of the 
Objection. viz. the Morall of the Gospell’ (CS 59). Ancient 
republics had encouraged public-spiritedness and a tolerance for 
diverse opinions in a manner which cast a profoundly negative 
light on Christian polities. This was not an especially delicate 
point: an admiration for classical republicanism was widely 
shared by Shaftesbury’s contemporaries—both Whig and 
‘Country’ Tory—and did not need to be couched in excessively 
‘modest’ terms. It was his claim about ‘knowledg of this sort’ 
which Shaftesbury recognised to be delicate; and it was this 
which he was most keen to emphasise in the work. Here as 
 
Matthew Tindal, for example, both compared Christ’s crucifixion unfavourably with the 
suicides of Cato and Socrates: Justin Champion, Republican Learning: John Toland 
and the Crisis of Christian Culture (Manchester, 2003), 156–58. 
 104 James W. Hulse, The Reputation of Socrates: the Afterlife of a Gadfly (New 
York, 1995), 87–121; Mario Montuori, De Socrate Iuste Damnato: The Rise of the 
Socratic Problem in the Eighteenth Century (Amsterdam, 1981), 9–25; Ian Macgregor 
Morris, ‘The Refutation of Democracy? Socrates in the Enlightenment’, in M. Trapp 
(ed.), Socrates from Antiquity to the Enlightenment (Aldershot, 2007), 209–28; and 
William J. Prior, ‘The Socratic Problem’, in H.H. Benson (ed.), A Companion to Plato 
(Oxford, 2006), 25–35. Only Hulse discusses Shaftesbury but seems to have been 
unaware of the ‘Chartae Socraticae’, which explains why he follows Cassirer in 
interpreting him as dedicated ‘to explaining the work of the Cambridge Platonists’ and 
remaining ‘firmly within the Christian tradition’ (95). 
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elsewhere, and in sharp contrast to Locke, Shaftesbury’s claim 
was that the moral law revealed in the Gospels had contributed 
nothing to, indeed it had positively contradicted, the ‘moral 
science’ established by the Socratic philosophers by means of 
reason alone. This was the crux of the argument Shaftesbury 
intended to develop in the ‘Chartae Socraticae’. It was aimed 
squarely at Locke’s attempt in his moral theology to render 
‘virtue’ synonymous with Christian ‘duty’, and to present the 
Gospels as alone providing men with a guide to life. 
 For Shaftesbury the most important of the many differences 
between Plato and Xenophon concerned the explanation each 
offered of the ‘daemonic sign’ (ποτρεπτικός). This was an inner 
voice Socrates claimed to hear when he was about to make a 
mistake.105 Plato’s interpretation, most especially in Phaedo, 
implied that Socrates’ character and teachings owed much to 
‘Divine inspiration & [the] infusion of Goodness’ (CS 74–75). It 
was this Platonic presentation of Socrates upon which Christian 
syncretists drew—such as Theophilus Gale in The Court of the 
Gentiles (1669–78), which asserted that ‘Socrates had very 
Metaphysic contemplations of Divine Mysteries’. In accordance 
with his central thesis, Gale then proceeded to argue that 
Socrates’ distinctly proto-Christian theism, and that of Plato, 
derived ‘originally from the Jewish Church’ (that is, from the 
Mosaic revelation).106 Henry More and Thomas Stanley similarly 
presented Socrates as a believer in the immateriality of the soul 
on the basis of the account provided by Plato, and later by 
Plutarch and Lactantius.107  It was this suggestion that Socrates 
 
 105 On which, see Anthony A. Long, ‘How Does Socrates’ Divine Sign 
Communicate with Him?’, in S. Ahbel-Rappe & R. Kamtekar (eds.), A Companion to 
Socrates (Oxford, 2006), 63–74. 
 106 Theophilus Gale, The Court of the Gentiles (Oxford, 1669–78), Part II (1670), 
217. 
 107 Henry More, Enchiridion Ethicum (London, 1668), [Bk.] III, [Ch.] 10, [Para.] 5; 
Thomas Stanley, The History of Philosophy [1655–62], 4th edn (London, 1743), [Part] 
III, 113–15. 
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considered himself to be divinely inspired, and that it was his 
sincere belief in a future state of rewards and punishments that 
reconciled him to his death, that Shaftesbury was anxious to 
repudiate. In this regard Shaftesbury’s preference for Xenophon 
was overwhelming, and his contempt for Plato unmistakeable. 
‘Plato receeds from Truth’, Shaftesbury argued, ‘chiefly & 
allmost wholly in this alone in drawing Socrates into 
Metaphisicall & Theological Notions’ (CS 40).108 Yet as his 
repeated self-cautions illustrate, Shaftesbury recognised the need 
to tread carefully: ‘Socrates, unmoveably following whatever he 
thought ποτρεπτικός, which plainly was Reason [speak modestly 
however]’ (CS 134). Socrates would have endorsed ‘the 
Definition of Virtue as a Science’, one deducible only by ‘those 
Philosophers amongst the rest who know Necessity, the Nature of 
Evill, Providence particular & General’ (CS 74–75; 52–53). 
Socrates had accomplished this ‘Science’ on the basis of reason 
alone, as had Shaftesbury in the Inquiry. There was nothing 
‘supernaturall’ about his understanding of morality or religion. 
Meanwhile: 
 
If we could assert this of Socrates viz: that he thus strenuously maintained 
the Immortality of the Soul we should be glad as honouring our Hero: but 
truth will not permitt (as has been at length discours’d above) and we had 
rather he should suffer than violate truth [take care of appearance of irony] 
(CS 48). 
 
For Shaftesbury, it is evident, Socrates was no believer in 
immortality, let alone immateriality (as Plato suggested in 
Phaedo). Socrates was quite willing and able to establish an 
account of moral obligation that had no need for the doctrine of a 
 
 108 It seems clear that Shaftesbury associated ‘metaphysics’ almost entirely with the 
attempt to establish the existence of immaterial substances (and, consequently, the 
immortality of the soul). This definition seems to have been fairly conventional. In his 
translation of Descartes’ Meditations, Locke’s friend William Molyneux defined it in 
precisely this way: Six Metaphysical Meditations; Wherein it is Proved that there is a 
God. And that Mans Mind is really Distinct from his Body (London, 1680), esp. sig. A2v 
(I owe this reference to Dimitri Levitin). This explains Shaftesbury’s profound 
contempt for the subject, as expressed in the index to Characteristicks. 
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future state. This was precisely the position Shaftesbury sought to 
vindicate against Locke. This point is related to Shaftesbury’s 
presentation of the Socratic tradition as entirely ‘self-formed’ in 
two distinct senses. 
 First, it owed nothing to other traditions, and here Shaftesbury 
was especially concerned to emphasise its autonomy from 
learning as it had developed in the ‘motherland of superstition’, 
Egypt.109 In his ‘Metaphysicall & Theological Notions’, 
conversely, Plato ‘drew from Chaldea Egypt Pythagoras &c.’, 
and it was for this reason that his account of Socrates was largely 
to be considered a ‘fiction’ (CS 66). Only in these nations was the 
doctrine of a future state incorporated into their distinctly 
metaphysical moral philosophizing, not in Greece.110 In a series 
of long footnotes in the Miscellanies that constituted the third 
volume of Characteristicks, Shaftesbury drew from the 
antiquarian scholarship of Sir John Marsham and John Spencer to 
establish the origins of Hebraic learning and the Judeo-Christian 
tradition in Egyptian superstition. In this regard, he sought to 
reverse the thesis developed by Gale, Locke’s antagonist Edward 
Stillingfleet, Ralph Cudworth, Pierre-Daniel Huet and Newton 
that heathen polytheism represented the corruption of purer 
Hebraic ideas concerning God’s unity and providence.111 Yet 
 
 109 ‘Thus GREECE, tho she exported Arts to other Nations, had properly for her 
share no Import of the kind’: Miscellany III, 86. 
 110 A claim which William Warburton set out to deny in his Divine Legation of 
Moses Demonstrated (1738–41): see Brian Young, Religion and Enlightenment in 
Eighteenth-Century England: Theological Debate from Locke to Burke (Oxford, 1998), 
ch. 5. 
 111 On this, see John Gascoigne, ‘“The Wisdom of the Egyptians” and the 
Secularisation of History in the Age of Newton’, in S. Gaukroger (ed.), The Uses of 
Antiquity: the Scientific Revolution and the Classical Tradition (Dordrecht, 1991), 171–
212; Richard H. Popkin, ‘The Crisis of Polytheism and the Answers of Vossius, 
Cudworth and Newton’, in J. E. Force & R. H. Popkin (eds.), Essays on the Context, 
Nature and Influence of Isaac Newton’s Theology (Dordrecht, 1990), 9–25; and Richard 
Serjeantson, ‘David Hume’s Natural History of Religion (1757) and the End of Modern 
Eusebianism’, in S. Mortimer & J. Robertson (eds.), The Intellectual Consequences of 
Religious Heterodoxy, 1600–1750 (Leiden, 2012), 267–96. 
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where John Toland’s hermetic interests saw him similarly assert 
the historical primacy of Egypt in order to lionise the tolerant 
civil religion he found in the prisca sapienta, Shaftesbury’s 
purpose was quite different.112 For Shaftesbury, a tolerant ethical 
theism could only be established on Socratic (and Homeric) 
foundations that were entirely separate from, and in conflict with, 
the mystical ‘wisdom’ of Syria, Egypt and Mosaic Israel. It 
followed that the Judeo-Christian tradition, born of Eastern 
mysticism and superstition, had corrupted a pure Hellenistic 
philosophical tradition—not the other way around. 
 This leads to the second sense in which the Socratic tradition 
was ‘self-formed’. It literally grew out of reflections on the self, 
and on the true source of happiness as lying within in constancy 
and order of mind. This was enshrined in the citation from 
Persius’ Satires that appeared on the title-page of Soliloquy: ‘No 
need to inquire outside yourself’.113 For Shaftesbury this served to 
endorse the claim that truly virtuous conduct relied neither on the 
infusion of efficacious grace, nor on the recognition of one’s 
accountability before an external (divine) law accompanied by 
(eternal) sanctions. It also suggested that the individual would 
find no moral assistance in the Scriptures—which spoke of law, 
sin and grace—and ought not to seek it there.  
 In the ‘Chartae Socraticae’, Shaftesbury sought to appeal to 
‘those that are neither Enthusiasts nor Atheisticall’. ‘Enthusiasts’ 
drew upon Plato to emphasise the need for ‘inspiration’ and an 
‘infusion of goodness’ for the perfection of virtue. They found in 
the notions of the ‘sublime philosopher’ a means of establishing 
the truth of Christianity upon the metaphysical foundations 
 
 112 On Toland, see Champion, Pillars of Priestcraft Shaken, 99–169; id., 
Republican Learning, 165–89; and Humberto Garcia, Islam and the English 
Enlightenment 1670–1840 (Baltimore, 2012), 1–29. 
 113 ‘Nec te quaesiveris extra’: Persius, Satires, ed. S. M. Braund (Cambridge, MA, 
2004), Satire 1, line 7. 
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provided by heathen learning (CS 74).114 Ultimately, such 
‘enthusiasts’ developed an Aristotelian-Thomist account of grace: 
it super-added the theological virtues (faith, hope and charity) to 
those cardinal virtues that man was able to identify and cultivate 
through his own efforts. As the example of hospitality showed, 
for Shaftesbury it was the purveyors of Socratic philosophy who 
had understood the true foundations of an extensive (universal) 
love of mankind. Christianity had by contrast introduced an 
‘unnatural’ affection of ‘Misanthropy’ quite unknown to the 
heathen philosophers. In this regard, far from enlarging upon or 
completing the natural law, the Christian revelation had actively 
subverted it. Shaftesbury was also at pains to deny the claims of 
neo-Epicurean ‘Atheists’ such as Bacon that Socrates was a 
sceptic ‘of an ostentatious Nature’, who was content to leave ‘all 
Things in Doubt and Uncertainty’.115 Such an interpretation 
suggested that men were indelibly sinful and as incapable of 
certainty in moral matters as in religious. This conformed to a 
voluntaristic theology and account of grace that owed much to 
Augustine. In contrast, Shaftesbury emphasised that Socrates was 
really a dogmatist in his philosophy, even as he shunned the 
‘Dogmatick style’ in sharing his wisdom with those of lesser 
capacity than himself (CS 52).  
 In passages scattered throughout Characteristicks, and 
especially in the Miscellanies, Shaftesbury provided a history of 
Christianity that sought to explain why its professors invariably 
veered between ‘Enthusiasm’ and ‘Atheism’. Shaftesbury 
provocatively emphasised that, had it not been either 
 
 114 Shaftesbury’s hostility to Plato’s ‘Metaphysicall and Theologicall Notions’, a 
consequence of his antipathy towards Christian soteriology more generally, calls into 
question his supposed sympathy with the Cambridge Platonists. For accounts that 
present Shaftesbury as endorsing a neo-Platonic form of Christian apologetic, see 
especially Ernst Cassirer, The Platonic Renaissance in England, trans. J. P. Pettegrove 
(London, 1953), 157–202; and Michael B. Gill, ‘From Cambridge Platonism to Scottish 
Sentimentalism’, Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 8 (2010): 13–32. 
 115 Francis Bacon, ‘Of Vain Glory’, and ‘Of the Discredits of Learning’, in Lord 
Bacon’s Essays, or Counsels Moral and Civil (2 vols., London, 1720), i, 330; ii, 60–61. 
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injudiciously persecuted or (conversely) imposed by the civil 
magistrate, Christianity could not have established itself so 
widely. Julian the Apostate, a ‘generous and mild Emperor’, 
received his education from both heathen and Christian teachers 
and, as Shaftesbury noted with heavy irony, ‘very unfortunately’ 
chose to adhere ‘to the antient Religion of his Country and 
Forefathers’. All he found in Christianity was an invitation to 
inhumanity through the subversion of men’s natural affections; it 
had ‘so little regard...to true Piety; so little Obedience to our 
Laws and Constitutions; however humane and tolerating’.116 On 
the one hand, this reflected the particular species of Christianity 
preached by self-interested clerics. Here Shaftesbury’s historical 
account of the malignant effects of ‘priestcraft’ as a ‘trade’ that 
had developed in Syria, Egypt, Israel and subsequently Christian 
Rome was almost identical to the narratives provided by 
contemporary freethinkers such as Walter Moyle and Charles 
Blount.117 On the other hand, in Shaftesbury’s account those 
convinced of the truth of revealed Christianity were to some 
degree forced to emphasise God’s power over his goodness 
precisely because the Scriptures, including the Gospels, did not 
conform to the ‘divine and moral Truths’ established by Socratic 
philosophy. 
 In this regard, from its very inception Christianity was of 
necessity a ‘political’ religion—a point Hobbes had understood 
only too well. Unlike Grecian polytheism, it won men over by 
appealing to their base appetites rather than by alluding to higher 
moral truths. Here Shaftesbury’s interpretation of the relative 
moral and pedagogical consequences of polytheistic fables and 
Christian teaching neatly inverted Augustine’s account in the 
Confessions. Homer, argued Augustine, ‘attributed divine 
 
 116 Miscellany II, 55 n. For broad discussion of the manner in which, from Bayle to 
Gibbon, the interpretation of Julian offered one means for philosophers to broach the 
question of the moral implications and consequences of Christianity, see David 
Womersley, The Transformation of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (Oxford, 
1988), 156–68.  
 117 A point emphasised by Champion, Pillars of Priestcraft Shaken, 210–19. 
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sanction to vicious acts, which had the result that immorality was 
no longer counted immorality and anyone who so acted would 
seem to follow the example not of abandoned men but the gods in 
heaven’.118 For Shaftesbury it was Christian ‘Daemonism’ which 
corrupted morality, not pagan mythology. Whereas the Grecian 
mythological religion encouraged men to discipline their 
wayward ‘Fancys’, and was in this respect entirely consistent 
with the pedagogical dictates of true philosophy, with Christianity 
the opposite was the case. For Locke, with Christ moral 
philosophy and divinity were finally united. For Shaftesbury, 
Christianity was the natural and necessary enemy of true 
philosophy and theism, which it sought systematically to 
obliterate. Here Shaftesbury diverged from many contemporary 
freethinkers, who drew from Locke (however disingenuously) to 
argue that gospel Christianity was entirely consistent with—and 
therefore reducible to—the moral insights of true philosophy 
(right reason).119 Shaftesbury would in no sense have accepted 
Matthew Tindal’s later claim that revealed Christianity was 
merely the republication of the religion of nature.120 
 This is indicated by Shaftesbury’s mockery of sola scriptura 
Protestantism, and his pointed expressions of admiration for the 
‘political model’ of Christianity developed by the Papacy. The 
Roman Church, Shaftesbury argued, sought to provide a religion 
that satisfied both ‘Enthusiasts’ and ‘Atheists’. Rome 
simultaneously emphasised God’s goodness and His power. It 
tolerated the mysticism of mendicant orders that established faith 
 
 118 St. Augustine, Confessions, trans. H. Chadwick (Oxford, 1992), 1.16.25. 
 119 On the distinction between the vocabularies of natural law (‘right reason’) 
favoured by freethinkers like Toland and Shaftesbury’s ethical theory, see Laurent 
Jaffro, ‘Toland and the Moral Teaching of the Gospel’, in R. Savage (ed.), Philosophy 
and Religion in Enlightenment Britain (Oxford, 2012), 77–89. For an excellent 
discussion of the difficulties of gauging the sincerity of freethinking claims to 
sympathise with ‘latitudinarian’ strands within Restoration Anglican apologetic, see 
Rivers, Reason, Grace and Sentiment, ii, 76–83. 
 120 Matthew Tindal, Christianity as Old as the Creation: Or, the Gospel, a 
Republication of the Religion of Nature (London, 1730). 
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on the (neo-Platonic) basis of ‘Contemplation, and Divine Love’. 
Yet its own authority and hierarchical ecclesiology relied upon 
the (Augustinian) claim to mediate between irretrievably sinful 
men and their jealous and capricious God. The ‘ROMAN-
Christian, and once Catholick Church’, Shaftesbury noted, ‘knew 
how to make advantage from both the high Speculations of 
Philosophy, and the grossest Ideas of vulgar Ignorance’.121 It 
found much to value in the philosophy of Plato, Sextus and 
Epicurus but, given the cause it sought to defend, nothing at all in 
the moral teachings of the Socratics. 
 Sola scriptura Protestantism, however, claimed to find in the 
moral teachings of the Scriptures all the evidence required to 
establish the divine origins of Christianity. Here Shaftesbury 
again contrasted the Scriptures to the miraculous fables of ancient 
Greece. The latter were (rightfully) considered to be in some 
sense sacred on account of their entire conformity with nature and 
‘all divine and moral Truth’. Only ‘Enthusiasts’ would make this 
claim for the Scriptures. They were ‘multifarious, voluminous, 
and of the most difficult Interpretation’ and, more importantly, 
they contradicted men’s natural moral sentiments. Only by 
abandoning the objective standard of moral goodness and 
deformity found within one’s breast and most fully articulated by 
the Socratic philosophers might the Scriptures be considered to 
express ‘the justest Moral Truths’.  
 It was for this reason that Shaftesbury argued that ‘mere 
human Hearts’ would, if uncorrupted, resist ‘the Divine 
Commission’. Only ‘Enthusiasts and Fanatics’ would ignore this 
internal guide in favour of such an arbitrary and obnoxious 
standard of moral excellence. Given that the Scriptures lent 
themselves to an infinity of interpretations, to follow them was 
effectively to abandon moral rules and to embrace those notions 
of the good suggested by one’s own ‘aerial Fancy, or heated 
Imagination’, or those presented by self-interested clerics.122 The 
 
 121 Miscellany II, 57–59. 
 122 Miscellany V, 141–45. 
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disastrous effects of such enthusiasm, and its ability to portray the 
most unnatural practices and affections as the height of goodness 
and piety, had been revealed ‘during the Times of the late great 
Troubles’ (the Civil War).123 Hobbes’s Leviathan was an attempt 
to introduce a ‘general Scepticism’ to wean men away from 
placing trust in antinomian enthusiasts. Hobbes might be 
considered as ‘a Martyr for our Deliverance’; a ‘good sociable 
Man’ himself, he nonetheless painted the most execrable picture 
of human nature.124 In his system of ‘Political Christianity’, 
Hobbes had attempted to re-establish the balance lost at the 
Reformation between the Christian God’s goodness and 
immanence, and his power and transcendence. Responding to the 
excessive claims for the former, Hobbes had uniformly 
emphasised the latter.125 
 Shaftesbury remarked that the various Protestant churches now 
rested their authority on what he termed a ‘more generous 
Foundation’ than that of the moral excellence of the Scriptures. 
They had turned once more to the historical testimony of the 
Fathers and the early Councils.126 Shaftesbury made it clear that a 
‘nicely critical Historical Faith’ was in practice untenable; the 
weight of evidence spoke strongly against the credibility of such 
‘antient Facts or Persons’.127 Be that as it may, for Shaftesbury 
this movement towards regarding the sacred sources as merely 
historical documents was an indication of the gradual 
improvement that had taken place in Protestant nations, and 
 
 123 Referred to in this manner by Shaftesbury in his preface to Select Sermons of 
Dr. Whichcot: in Two Parts (London, 1698), A8r. 
 124 Sensus Communis, 2.1, 56–57; Moralists, 2.3, 153–54; Moralists, 2.4, 179–80. 
 125 Select Sermons, A4r; Sensus Communis, 2.1, 57 
 126 On this Anglican turn to tradition and the Fathers, see Jean-Louis Quantin, The 
Church of England and Christian Antiquity: The Construction of a Confessional 
Identity in the Seventeenth Century (Oxford, 2009). 
 127 Miscellany II, 45–47. 
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especially in England, ‘the latest barbarous, the last civiliz’d or 
polish’d People of EUROPE’.128 The model of true barbarism 
was, for Shaftesbury, provided by ‘Eastern Religionists’ and the 
‘Mahometan Clergy’. They established their religion, as 
misguided sola scriptura Protestants had all too recently sought 
to do in England, solely on ‘a Book’ (the Koran) which they 
claimed was ‘not only perfect, but inimitable’. A ‘real Man of 
Letters, and a just Critick’ would have little trouble exposing this 
claim as specious. In order to defend such a contention, they had 
extinguished ‘all true Learning, Science and the politer Arts’ and, 
most notably, banished ‘the ancient Authors and Languages’. It 
was the ‘moral science’ to be found in the poetry and philosophy 
of the ancients that most exposed the Koran— as it did the 
Christian scriptures and Fathers— as profoundly deficient both in 
style and (moral) doctrine. A similarly ‘barbaric’ enmity against 
ancient learning had been indulged by the early Christians. This 
illustrated that ‘they had no very high Idea of the holy Scriptures, 
when they supposed them such Losers by a Comparison’.129 
Shaftesbury’s underlying point, however, was that the early 
Fathers had been quite correct in this judgement. 
 Shaftesbury expressed an optimism that ‘there is a mighty light 
which spreads over the world’, and with the establishment of 
peace in Europe ‘it is impossible but letters and knowledge must 
advance in greater proportion than ever’.130 For Shaftesbury, this 
advance in learning was enshrined in, and dependent upon, the 
revitalisation of classical moral philosophy. This was causally 
related to the increasing tendency to look to the Scriptures solely 
to attest to ‘the principle Facts concerning the Authority of 
Revelation’, rather than as the foundation of all moral truth.131 
 
 128 Miscellany III, 93. 
 129 Miscellany V, 143–44, 147. 
 130 Shaftesbury to Le Clerc, 6 Mar. 1706, in Life, Letters, 352–54. 
 131 Miscellany V, 144–45, 159 n. 
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That is, it depended upon a turn away from Christian moral 
theology, which had subordinated and appropriated classical 
philosophy in order to establish both the reasonableness and 
moral necessity of revealed Christianity. Men might now once 
more be freed to look to ‘Nature and the Antients’ for ‘the justest 
Moral Truths’ and ‘the best Doctrine and Instruction in Life and 
Manners’ (the ‘Vitae Dux’). The greatest impediment to this 
second Renaissance, however, was Lockean philosophy.  
 It was Locke who had claimed the title of philosopher, and 
professed to defend the sacred causes of virtue and religion from 
Hobbes’s ‘wit’. Yet, for Shaftesbury, Locke’s primary concern as 
a ‘zealous Christian and Believer’ had been to justify the moral 
teachings of the Scriptures as ‘not only perfect, but inimitable’. 
His conviction that the Scriptures were ‘exhibitive of the best 
Doctrine and Instruction in Life and Manners’ would have been 
obliterated had he been but tolerably knowledgeable of the ‘state 
of philosophy with the ancients’. Had Locke turned to the true 
(Stoic) sources of classical wisdom, he would necessarily have 
distinguished clearly between moral philosophy and revealed 
theology, reason and Christian faith. This was a separation which, 
for Shaftesbury, represented the sine qua non for the 
advancement of ‘letters’ and (moral) ‘knowledge’. Instead Locke 
sought, by any means possible, to render them inseparable; and it 
followed that he ‘made great alterations on these points where, 
though a divine may waver, a philosopher, I think, never can’. 
The ‘great points’ to which Shaftesbury referred were ‘liberty and 
necessity’, which he regarded as ‘the test and touchstone of a 
genius in philosophy’.132 
 Only the ‘two real distinct philosophies’ had provided durable 
definitions of these. Man’s ‘liberty’ lay in striving to live 
according to his nature and ‘true Scope and End’, thereby 
attaining respite from the continual ‘unease’ caused by his 
mutinous ‘Fancys’. For the Stoic, this demanded that he 
 
 132 Shaftesbury to Stanhope, 7 Nov. 1709, in Life, Letters, 413–17. On this, see 
Robert Toole, ‘The Concepts of Freedom and Necessity in Shaftesbury’s Philosophy’, 
Studia Leibnitiana, 9 (1977): 190–211. 
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acquiesce with the workings of an orderly providential universe, 
and love mankind. For the Epicurean it required that he abandon 
all ideas of design and order in the universe, and with it any 
notion of God or objective moral truth. The ‘credulous Mr. 
LOCKE’ sought to synthesise elements of the two by combining 
a hedonic psychology with a defence of morality and religion. For 
Shaftesbury, he sought to reconcile ‘Atoms’ with ‘God’. It 
followed that men ‘have scarce heard of what it is to combat with 
their Appetites and Senses […] they rather raise and advance 
them by all possible Means, without Fear of adding Fuel to their 
inflam’d Desires, in a Heart, which can never burn towards GOD, 
till those other Fires are extinct’.133 Establishing the origins of 
universal morality (natural law) in an external law (God’s will as 
expressed through revelation), Locke signally failed to ‘examine 
himself and consider his natural passions’. The ‘unnatural’ 
affection of ‘Misanthropy’, commended by the capricious God of 
Abraham and Isaac, was instead made ‘natural’ to all men.134 
 To substantiate such a base portrayal of human nature, it was 
to the depictions of degenerate and barbarous nations provided by 
‘Modern Wonder-Writers’ that Locke turned. In so doing, Locke 
‘gave up an Argument for the Deity, which CICERO (tho’ a 
profess’d Sceptick) would not explode’.135 Even Cicero had 
recognised that a belief in the existence of a providential order 
and an acknowledgment of man’s natural ‘SENSE of inward 
Proportion and Regularity of Affection’ provided the sole grounds 
for theistic faith. Yet on Shaftesbury’s interpretation, as Bacon 
had destroyed the former, so Locke had obliterated the latter.136 In 
looking to Christianity and a future state to explain man’s true 
end, Locke had exploded what both the Stoics and Epicureans 
 
 133 Shaftesbury to Ainsworth, 19 Nov. 1707, in Several Letters, 12. 
 134 Miscellany IV [1711], 128–38. 
 135 Shaftesbury to Ainsworth, 3 June 1709, in Several Letters, 39–41. 
 136 Miscellany IV, 128–38. 
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had recognised to be the sole argument for theism and universal 
morality. Locke’s moral theology represented, for Shaftesbury, a 
profoundly misled attempt to establish his ‘Daemonism’ 
(Christian belief) on philosophical foundations: 
 
’Tis this must render Revelation probable, and secure that first step to it, 
the Belief of a Deity and Providence. A Providence must be prov’d from 
what we see in the Order in things present. We must contend for Order; and 
in this part chiefly, where Virtue is concern’d. All must not be refer’d to a 
Hereafter. For a disorder’d State, in which all present Care of Things is 
given up, Vice uncontroul’d, and Virtue neglected, represents the very 
Chaos, and reduces us to the belov’d Atoms, Chance, and Confusion of the 
Atheists.137 
 
§4. 
The interpretation of his philosophy, and the reading of his 
classicism, provided in this article raises serious questions of the 
now-hegemonic interpretation of Shaftesbury as an apologist for 
the ideal of a gentlemanly coffee-house sociability suitable to a 
commercial, urbanised and defiantly ‘Whig’ modernity. In the 
modern world no less than the ancient, virtue was confined to 
those who were able and willing to recognise their true happiness 
as rational beings as residing in disinterested virtue, and to refer 
all moral actions to this ultimate end. This was a challenge that 
for Shaftesbury was only likely to be accepted by those few 
individuals who, unlike the ‘polite’ gentlemen by whom they 
were surrounded, were willing ‘to spend two or three hours 
together, on mere PHILOSOPHY and MORALS’.138 Indeed, the 
‘brutal’ exercise in ‘self-dissection’ which this required—
advocated by Shaftesbury in Soliloquy and practiced in the 
Askēmata—required a detachment from rather than involvement 
in society, since ‘Company is an extreme Provocative to Fancy; 
and, like a hot Bed in Gardening, is apt to make our Imaginations 
 
 137 Moralists, 2.3, 156–57. 
 138 Miscellany V, 176. 
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sprout too fast’.139  
 This is not to say that Shaftesbury discouraged active 
engagement in society and public life, which the true ‘Theistic’ 
philosophy demanded. Rather Shaftesbury’s point was that such 
involvement carried grave dangers, and potentially led the 
individual to lose sight of his true end (loving virtue, and acting 
on it, for virtue’s own sake). After all, the sublimation of one’s 
recalcitrant desires out of a concern for one’s reputation in the 
beau monde rendered men but ‘cheaply virtuous’ (I 1.2.4, 22). 
Only philosophy, as practiced by the ancients and denigrated by 
the moderns, could allow for the remodelling and disciplining of 
the self which ought to be the aim of all who would be virtuous. 
Only the virtuous, in turn, ought to offer themselves up as public 
models to be admired.140 
 The relative lack of scholarly interest in the content of 
Shaftesbury’s philosophical thought has resulted in a further 
misunderstanding, encapsulated in Klein’s claim that Shaftesbury 
‘talked little of Jesus and assigned him no role except that of 
moral exemplar’.141 The fundamental point Shaftesbury 
developed, one that intentionally struck at the foundations of 
Locke’s moral theory and Christian apologetic, was that Christ 
could not play this role. To erect Christ as the paragon of moral 
excellence necessarily subverted the appreciation of truth and 
harmony in moral actions to which both ‘Nature and the Antients’ 
led them.  
 
 139 Soliloquy, 1.1, 100. 
 140 This might help to explain Shaftesbury’s own withdrawal from public life: the 
Askēmata certainly suggests that Shaftesbury found such active involvement in public 
affairs to imperil his hard-won tranquillity. One of Shaftesbury’s most biting critics, 
Bernard Mandeville, was quick to draw attention to this contradiction between ‘his 
Lordship’s’ endorsement of a ‘civil’ and ‘social’ philosophy, and his notorious aversion 
to public office and contempt for polite society: ‘A Search into the Nature of Society’ 
[1723], in The Fable of the Bees, ed. F.B. Kaye (2 vols., Oxford, 1924; repr. 
Indianapolis, 1988), i, 332–33. 
 141 Klein, Culture of Politeness, 158. 
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 To be sure, in his published writings Shaftesbury was 
studiously elliptical in making this point. As his constant self-
reminders to ‘speak modestly’ and ‘avoid the appearance of 
irony’ in the ‘Chartae Socraticae’ suggest, he exercised 
understandable caution in expressing himself openly. Yet a 
contextual reading of Shaftesbury’s published works and private 
papers substantiates this claim clearly enough. Christianity, both 
as it was delivered in the Scriptures and as it had been propagated 
in the world, was at odds with the moral and religious philosophy 
of the Socratic tradition with which he explicitly and repeatedly 
identified himself.  
 The primary objective of Shaftesbury’s philosophy was to 
vindicate a capacious Stoic philosophical tradition that was 
presented as uncompromisingly hostile to revealed Christianity. 
Its anti-Christian animus presented a very real challenge for those 
philosophers, such as Francis Hutcheson, who subsequently 
turned to Shaftesbury in an attempt to re-establish a synthesis 
between a Stoic moral theory and a moderate and reasonable 
Christianity.142 In his highly self-conscious attempt to reformulate 
philosophy as ‘an agreeable vehicle for the moral potion’, 
Shaftesbury cast a profoundly contemptuous verdict on the 
unphilosophical age in which providence had seen fit to place 
him. Notwithstanding his ‘high Airs of SCEPTICISM’, 
Shaftesbury repeatedly emphasised that he was, like Socrates and 
Horace, ‘at the bottom, a real DOGMATIST’. His writings, as he 
pointed out in the Miscellanies, showed ‘plainly that he has his 
private Opinion, Belief, or Faith, as strong as any Devotee or 
Religionist of ’em all’.143 His sacred texts, however, were the 
 
 142 Hutcheson’s increasing concern to distinguish his Christianised Stoicism from 
Shaftesbury’s distinctly problematic interpretation of Stoic ethics remains in need of 
scholarly attention. For general discussion see Thomas Ahnert, The Moral Culture of 
the Scottish Enlightenment, 1690–1805 (New Haven, 2014); Simon Grote, 
‘Hutcheson’s Divergence from Shaftesbury’, Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 4 (2006): 
159–72; and James A. Harris, ‘Religion in Hutcheson’s Moral Philosophy’, Journal of 
the History of Philosophy, 46 (2008): 205–22. 
 143 Miscellany III, 82 (see, too, 114–15). 
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‘moral works of Xenophon, Horace, the Commentaries and 
Enchridion of Epictetus as published by Arrian, and Marcus 
Antoninus’, not those of the Judeo-Christian 
tradition. 144  
University of Cambridge 
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